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Due Process in Micronesia: Are Fish
Due Less Process?
Kathleen M. Burch*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia has
rigorously sought to protect the constitutional rights of foreign na-
tionals, particularly the owners of foreign fishing vessels whose
vessels are subject to in rem forfeiture actions because the vessel
was used to fish illegally within the jurisdiction of the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM).' While at first glance it appears that
the FSM Supreme Court has adequately protected the due process
rights of the vessel owner, upon closer examination, the minimal
safeguards established by the Court are inadequate to satisfy con-
stitutional due process. The judicially created post-seizure hearing
is fundamentally unfair because in the majority of cases it is the
only evidentiary hearing and acts as a determination on the merits
without the due process safeguards of a trial.
This Article addresses the issue of whether the judicially cre-
ated post-seizure hearing meets the due process requirements of
the FSM Constitution. The Article concludes that when the reali-
ties of the fishing industry and the manner in which illegal fishing
* Professor of Legal Writing, Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto
School of Law. B.A., 1986, Rosary College; J.D., 1989, Georgetown University Law
Center. The author worked for the State of Yap, Federated States of Micronesia,
in the Office of Attorney General for six years, first as Chief of Litigation from
1995-97, then as the Assistant Attorney General from 1997-2001. I thank
Genevieve Tinngig, Michael Gaan, and Jon Van Dyke for their assistance and
prompt response in locating and forwarding primary source material.
1. The FSM is an island state of approximately 607 islands with a landmass
of 270.8 square miles occupying one million square miles of the Pacific Ocean and
located approximately 2,500 miles southwest of Hawaii. FSM Visitors Center, Ge-
ography, at http://www.visit-fsm.org/visitors/geography.html (last visited Dec 17,
2002). The States comprising the FSM were formerly part of the United Nations
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. FSM Visitors Center, History, at http:/
www.visit-fsm.org/visitors/history.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
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cases are prosecuted are acknowledged, the judicially created post-
seizure hearing is fundamentally unfair, in violation of the vessel
owner's right to due process. The Article proposes a solution in the
form of a court adopted rule, which rule balances the constitutional
rights of the vessel owner, the geographic and economic realities of
the FSM, and the needs and concerns of the prosecuting
government.
In order to fully understand the importance of this issue to the
FSM, it is necessary to understand how the FSM's domestic fisher-
ies laws and how the FSM Supreme Court's role in protecting the
vessel owner have developed over the past quarter century.
A. Background
During the past twenty-five years, the FSM has been working
toward gaining economic independence through the exploitation of
its primary natural resource - the marine resources within its ex-
clusive economic zone (EEZ). In order to obtain economic inde-
pendence and to take their rightful place in the international com-
munity, Micronesians first had to gain their political independence
from the United States. Even before recognition as a coastal state
by the international community, the FSM took pro-active steps to
ensure that upon the ratification of the Third United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the international
community would recognize Micronesians' traditional rights to
their marine resources.
Micronesians have traditionally relied upon their marine re-
sources for survival. Prior to the mid-1980s, Micronesians relied
upon marine resources for subsistence. With the ratification of
UNCLOS III, Micronesians, who control vast expanses of ocean,
were able to charge distant water fishing fleets for access to those
ocean expanses where large quantities of tuna are caught by these
fishing fleets. Fishing soon became and remains the largest source
of income, other than foreign aid, for the FSM. 2
A healthy and vibrant fishing industry is essential to the eco-
nomic well-being of the FSM and its constituent states. A healthy
fishing industry requires foreign fishing fleets to legally fish within
2. Asian Development Bank, Country Economic Review: Federated States of
Micronesia, Nov. 2000, Table A-8: Consolidated General Government Finances -
Revenues, available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/CERs/FSM/CER/_FSM_
2000.pdf.
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the FSM EEZ and to base their fleets within the FSM. The juris-
diction where a foreign fleet fishes is determined by the location of
the fish and the legal and regulatory framework of the fishing in-
dustry within a particular jurisdiction.
Over the past decade, the FSM has experienced a dramatic
drop in both foreign fishing fees and in on-shore foreign invest-
ment in the fisheries industry. This decline in economic activity
within the fisheries sector can be explained only in part by the cli-
mactic effects of el nifto, a weather pattern that causes an increase
of ocean water temperature which, in turn, causes tuna migration
to cooler ocean areas.3 While it is easy for foreign fishing fleets to
claim that they are leaving a jurisdiction because they are not be-
ing treated fairly, when on-shore investment leaves the country,
the legal and regulatory framework must be assessed to determine
whether there is any legitimacy to the complaint of unfairness.
B. Assessing the Due Process Framework
While many FSM laws affect the fishing industry, this Article
focuses on the FSM domestic fisheries laws. The development of
the FSM's domestic fisheries law is integrally tied to the emer-
gence of the FSM as a nation-state. The legal rights the FSM and
its constituent states are enforcing through their fisheries laws are
based in international law. Thus, this Article will first address the
international foundations of the FSM's rights to enforce its fisher-
ies laws. The FSM's rights are founded in UNCLOS III and nu-
merous regional agreements, including the South Pacific Forum
Fisheries Agency Convention and the Nauru Agreement Concern-
ing Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common
Interest.
The Article will then turn to the FSM's domestic fisheries
laws. Following the principles of Micronesian customary law, the
FSM has divided jurisdiction over its marine space between the
FSM Government and the state governments, with the FSM exer-
cising sovereign rights in the EEZ and the States exercising sover-
eign rights in the territorial sea. In order to obtain a fully
3. El Nifho and La Niha Affect Pacific Tuna Catches, Pacific Islands Report
(June 21, 1999), available at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/June/06-22-
17.html; see also Marshall Islands Suffers Decreased Revenue from Tuna Licenses,
Pacific Islands Report (May 18, 2001), available at http://166.122.164.43/archive/
2001/May/05-29-05.html.
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integrated view of the FSM's domestic fisheries laws, those laws
enacted by the FSM Congress as well as those laws enacted by the
state legislatures must be considered. Due to the author's famili-
arity with the State of Yap, the discussion of state law will focus on
the Yap State Fishery Zone Act of 1980.
Because the FSM Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction
over admiralty and maritime cases in the FSM Supreme Court, the
Article next discusses the enforcement of the FSM's domestic fish-
eries laws within the procedures established by the Court. The fo-
cus is on the in rem forfeiture actions brought by both the FSM and
state governments and the judicially created post-seizure hearing,
commonly referred to as a probable cause hearing. After conclud-
ing that the judicially created probable cause hearing does not sat-
isfy the due process requirements of the FSM Constitution, the
Article proposes a solution: a prompt trial on the merits. The Arti-
cle suggests that the FSM Supreme Court promulgate the pro-
posed rule, which would require in rem forfeiture actions in illegal
fishing cases to proceed to trial on an expedited calendar. The pro-
posed rule strikes a balance between the constitutional due process
rights of the vessel owner, the geographic and economic reality of
the FSM, and the needs and concerns of the FSM in both protect-
ing marine resources and promoting economic development.
II. THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA
A. Background
The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III)4 was under discussion and negotiation during the
same time period that the islands of the Pacific were severing their
colonial ties with western industrial powers. 5 The former United
4. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS III], http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/
losc.htm.
5. UNCLOS III convened in 1973 and concluded in 1982. Oceans and Law of
the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Per-
spective), at http://www.un.org(Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention his-
torical perspective.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). In 1965, the Congress of
Micronesia was established, and in 1966, the Congress of Micronesia petitioned
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to begin status negotiations. The first round of
status negotiations was held in 1969. The first Congress of the Federated States of
Micronesia convened in May, 1979. Chronology of Events in Micronesia, Congress
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Nations Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands6 were no excep-
tion.7 In fact, the emerging international consensus regarding
coastal states' sovereignty over 200-mile EEZs and the marine re-
sources located therein, including highly migratory species (i.e.
tuna),8 fueled the islands' desire to obtain independence while at
the same time fueling the tension between the islands and their
colonial power, the United States.9 The FSM stood to make great
economic gains from the ratification of UNCLOS III. Moreover,
Micronesians believed that the international recognition of a
coastal state's right to a 200-mile EEZ with its inherent sover-
eignty over marine resources was an implicit validation of the his-
of the Federated States of Micronesia [hereinafter FSM Congress' Chronology of
Events in Micronesia], at http://www.fsmcongress.orglPressReleaseGenInfo/Chro-
nology.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2002).
6. The former Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands are now the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Belau,
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands. FSM Visitors Center,
History, at http://www.visit-fsm.org/visitors/history.html (last visited Dec. 17,
2002).
7. The Congress of Micronesia began discussions with the United States re-
garding independence and self-determination in 1969. The islands of Yap, Truk
(now Chuuk), Ponape (now Pohnpei), and Kosrae ratified the Constitution of the
Federated States of Micronesia at a territory-wide plebescite on July 12, 1978.
The effective date of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia is July
12, 1979. FSM CONST. art. XVI. The FSM did not gain full sovereignty until No-
vember 3, 1986, after the FSM Congress' and the U.S. Senate's ratification of the
Compact of Free Association. See FSM Congress' Chronology of Events in Micro-
nesia, supra note 5. The experiences of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and
the Republic of Belau were similar. See GEORGE KENT, THE POLITICS OF PACIFIC
ISLAND FISHERIES 42-44 (1980).
8. Tuna is the only resource of significant commercial value in the EEZ.
KENT, supra note 7, at 42-44.
9. In 1972, the Congress of Micronesia created the Joint Committee on the
Law of the Sea (Committee), which observed the United Nations Seabed Commit-
tee, the predecessor to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (LOS Confer-
ence). In 1973, the Committee informed the United States of the Micronesian 200-
mile zone claim based on the archipelago theory. In 1974, the Committee and
United States representatives entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
whereby Micronesians agreed to refrain from claiming archipelagic status and the
United States agreed to support the creation of the 200-mile EEZ and coastal state
regulation of tuna at the LOS Conference. One month later at the LOS Conference
in Caracas, Venezuela, the United States repudiated the Memorandum of Under-
standing. See FSM Congress' Chronology of Events in Micronesia, supra note 5. If
Micronesians had maintained the claim to archipelagic status, the ocean between
the islands would have become internal waters from which foreign fishing fleets
would have been excluded. See UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts, 46-54. In other
words, if the FSM had secured archipelagic status, the United States tuna fleet
would have been excluded from the world's most fertile tuna fishing grounds.
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toric Micronesian belief that islanders owned the marine resources
surrounding their islands.' °0
B. UNCLOS III
UNCLOS III recognizes a coastal state's sovereignty over air-
space, marine space, and the seabed and subsoil." While Microne-
sians gladly accepted sovereignty over airspace and the
corresponding seabed and subsoil, Micronesian sovereignty over
the marine space of the territorial sea and the EEZ was of greater
social, political, and economic importance.
The articles of UNCLOS III that propelled Micronesians to po-
litical independence and began the FSM's journey toward economic
independence can be divided into three categories: (1) Territorial
Sea; (2) Exclusive Economic Zone; and (3) Enforcement.
1. Territorial Sea
Article 2 of UNCLOS III extends the "sovereignty of a coastal
State . . . to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial
sea.' 2 "[Slovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil."' 3 The territorial sea may not
10. It is important to understand that Micronesians have always believed that
they own their ocean resources. See J. COMM. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 5TH CONG.
OF MICRONESIA, LAW OF THE SEA: THE PRELIMINARY MICRONESIAN PosITIoN (Sai-
pan, Mariana Islands 1973). The Journal of the FSM Constitutional Convention
confirms this understanding. Committee of Governmental Functions, SCREP No.
33, II J. MICRONESIAN CONST. CONVENTION 813, 819 (Oct. 10, 1975) ("Micronesian
custom generally recognizes family, clan or island ownership of fishery resources
within lagoons and for several miles beyond reefs."). For a discussion of the recent
position taken by the States of Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap with regard to
ownership of marine resources see Chuuk v. Sec'y of Fin., 9 FSM Intrm. 424 (App.
2000), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; and Chuuk v. Sec'y of Fin., 8 FSM
Intrm. 353 (Pon. 1998), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions. See also YAP STATE
CONST. art. XIII, § 5 ("The State recognizes traditional rights and ownership of
natural resources and areas within the marine space of the State .... No action
may be taken to impair these traditional rights and ownership . . . ."), http://
www.fsmlaw.org/yap/constitution. Id. § 6 ("A foreign fishing, research or explora-
tion vessel shall not take natural resources from any area within the marine space
of the State, except as may be permitted by the appropriate persons who exercise
traditional rights and ownership and by statute."), http://www.fsmlaw.org/yap/con-
stitution/.
11. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 2.1.
12. Id.
13. Id. art. 2.2.
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exceed "12 nautical miles, measured from the baselines" 14 of the
coastal state. For the majority of Micronesian islands, 15 the base-
line is the "outward of the low-water line of the reef."16 All waters
inward of the baseline are internal waters.' 7
All states enjoy the right of innocent passage through a coastal
state's territorial sea.' 8 Innocent passage does not include "fishing
activities"' 9 or "the carrying out of research or survey activities."20
A coastal state is granted the authority to "adopt laws and regula-
tions" to conserve the "living resources of the sea,"2 ' to prevent the
violation of "fisheries laws and regulations,"22 to regulate pollu-
tion,23 and to regulate "marine scientific research and hydro-
graphic surveys."24
With the international recognition of the territorial sea,
Micronesians obtained the right to legally exclude and enforce the
exclusion of foreign fishing fleets from the coastal waters they tra-
ditionally fished and continue to use for subsistence fishing. These
are the same waters that are the most economically and technolog-
ically feasible for Micronesians to exploit for their own economic
development.
2. Exclusive Economic Zone
In addition to the territorial sea, a coastal state has sovereign
rights over its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).25 The EEZ is 200
nautical miles measured outward from the baselines used to mea-
sure the territorial sea.26
14. Id. art. 3.
15. UNCLOS III establishes two methods for determining a coastal state's
baseline. Compare id. art. 5, with art. 6. The majority of Micronesian islands have
a fringing reef. The baselines for these islands are determined according to the
method set forth in Article 6. For an exception, see the island of Fais, one of the
islands of the State of Yap and one of the only high islands in the FSM without a
fringing reef.
16. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 6.
17. Id. art. 8.
18. Id. art. 17.
19. Id. art. 19.2(i).
20. Id. art. 19.2(j).
21. Id. art. 21.1(d).
22. Id. art 21.1(e).
23. Id. art. 21.1(f).
24. Id. art. 21.1(g).
25. Id. arts. 55-56.
26. Id. art. 57.
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A coastal state has the exclusive sovereign right to control ex-
ploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of all natu-
ral resources, both living and non-living, within its EEZ.27 In
other words, the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate all
economic activity within its EEZ, including fishing.28 Fishing has
been broadly defined to include all activities related to fishing.29
The coastal state has both the right and the obligation to limit the
fish catch by volume, species, season, and fishing method. 30 The
coastal state, using available scientific evidence, should set the al-
lowable catch at a level that will allow for maximum yield while
sustaining the species' ability to restore its population.31 TN-
CLOS III vests the coastal state with the right to environmentally
sustainable economic development of its EEZ.
Implicitly recognizing that many coastal states are developing
states that do not have the ability to fully exploit their own marine
resources, Article 62 of UNCLOS III carefully balances the devel-
oping state's sovereign rights against the distant water fishing na-
tion's economic needs. Each coastal state is required to determine
its ability to harvest the marine resources within its EEZ.32 If the
coastal state determines that it cannot harvest the "entire allowa-
ble catch," it must allow other states access to the surplus of
marine resources. 33 Access can be achieved through a variety of
27. Id. art 56.
28. Id. arts. 56(a), (b)(ii), (b)(iii).
29. Fishing includes:
[S]earching for, catching, taking or harvesting fish; attempting to search
for, catch, take or harvest fish, engaging in any other activity which can
reasonably be expected to result in the locating, catching, taking or har-
vesting fish; placing, searching for or recovering fish devices or associated
electronic equipment such as radio beacons; any operations at sea directly
in support of, or in preparation for, any activity described in this para-
graph; use of any other vehicle, air or sea-borne, for any of the activities
described in this paragraph; or any related activity.
Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access, No-
vember 30, 1994, art. 1 [hereinafter FSM Arrangement], http://www.oceanlaw.net/
texts/Micronesia.htm; see also FSM Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 102(32) (defining "fish-
ing"). Fishing includes the provision of fuel and other supplies to fishing vessels.
FSM v. Skico, Ltd., 8 FSM Intrm. 40 (Chk. 1997) (holding that a fuel tanker which
had no foreign fishing permit violated FSM fisheries law when it refueled fishing
vessels in FSM EEZ).
30. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 61.1, 62.4.
31. Id. art. 61.3.
32. Id. art. 62.2.
33. Id.
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agreements entered into between the coastal state and other states
or private parties.34 Coastal states can enact laws and regulations
regarding the execution of foreign fishing agreements and foreign
fishing.35 Foreign nationals fishing in a coastal state's EEZ are
required to comply with all of the coastal state's laws and
regulations. 36
The international recognition of a coastal state's sovereignty
over its EEZ, including the explicit right to charge an access fee or
to otherwise require payment for the privilege of extracting marine
resources,37 meant that small island states gained the right to con-
trol vast portions of the ocean and thus, to garner the correspond-
ing economic benefits from the natural resources located therein.
In other words, Micronesians now had the possibility of attaining
economic independence from the United States, either by harvest-
ing ocean resources themselves or charging an access fee to others
who would harvest those resources. 38
3. Enforcement
The possibility of economic development inspires hope for the
future. That hope, however, is meaningless without the ability to
realize economic benefit through the exercise of sovereignty. The
ability to enforce one's rights is an essential element of the exercise
of sovereignty. The international community recognized the im-
portance of enforcement mechanisms in UNCLOS III Article 73.1,
which provides that a coastal state may enforce its domestic fisher-
ies laws through such measures as boarding and inspecting vessels
within the territorial sea and EEZ and arresting and prosecuting
34. Id.
35. These laws and regulations can relate to licensing, access fees, catch quo-
tas by species, age, size or vessel, fishing seasons, gear, vessel and catch reports,
research, scientific data, observers, landing of catch, joint-venture arrangements,
training of fisheries personnel, transfer of fisheries technology, and enforcement.
Id. art. 62.4.
36. Id.
37. Id. art. 62.4(a).
38. Since its independence from the United States, foreign fishing fees have
remained the second largest source of income for the government of the FSM. The
largest source of income remains funds received from the United States through
the financial provisions of the Compact of Free Association. ASIAN DEv. BANK,
COUNTRY ECONOMIC REVIEW: FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA (Nov. 2000), at
http://www.adb.org(Documents/CERs/FSM/CERFSM_2000.pdf.
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foreign vessels and their owners for violating the coastal state's
domestic fisheries law.39
UNCLOS III explicitly recognizes the coastal state's right to
enforce its sovereignty over its territorial sea and EEZ.40 Enforce-
ment means more than the declaration of an EEZ and establish-
ment of a licensing procedure. Enforcement requires effective
surveillance, which in turn requires patrol boats, aircraft, and
trained personnel. Enforcement also requires an efficient legal
system capable of prosecuting illegal fishing cases, in other words,
implementing legislation, trained prosecutors, resources for expert
witnesses and translators, and court resources. Exercising sover-
eign rights is expensive. Developed coastal states with greater fi-
nancial resources are better able to exercise sovereignty over their
ocean resources than can emerging island states with no resources
other than their newly recognized ocean resources. UNCLOS III
merely establishes the framework of hope for economic indepen-
dence without addressing the economic reality that small island
states like the FSM do not have the tools to effectively exercise
sovereignty within their EEZs in such a way as to garner the full
economic benefits of the natural resources within those EEZs.4 1
UNCLOS III recognized the sovereign rights that provide
Micronesians with the possibility of substantial economic gains
and thus, economic and political independence. The economic
value of these sovereign rights are obtainable only if Micronesians
have the ability to collect more than a nominal fee from foreign
fishing fleets for the privilege of harvesting marine resources in
their EEZ and have the ability to exclude from their EEZ those
who do not pay the required fee. Micronesians need the ability to
negotiate equitable fishing agreements with developed distant
water fishing nations and the ability to enforce domestic fisheries
laws. UNCLOS III does not provide these mechanisms. In order
to realize the economic potential of the effective exercise of sover-
eignty over their EEZ, Micronesians turned to their Pacific Island
neighbors and a regional solution.
39. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 73.1.
40. Id. art. 73.
41. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 74 (Pon. 1985) ("With the limited
resources available here, it is extraordinarily difficult for law enforcement authori-
ties to police the vast waters of the Federated States of Micronesia. Yet, effective
law enforcement to prevent fishing violations is crucial to the economic interests of
this new nation."), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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III. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
A. South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention
Even before the ratification of UNCLOS III, the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (Convention)4 2 recognized
coastal states' sovereign rights over the marine resources located
in the EEZ4 3 and established mechanisms for the full realization of
these sovereign rights. 44 These same sovereign rights were recog-
nized three years later in Articles 2 and 56 of UNCLOS III.45 The
Convention was entered into as a response to the conflict of inter-
est that had arisen during the negotiation of UNCLOS III between
the colonial powers' attempts to further their interests as distant
water fishing nations and their fiduciary duties to their lesser de-
veloped colonies.4 6 The Convention was a strong message to the
international community and, in particular, to distant water fish-
ing nations during UNCLOS III negotiations that the small Pacific
island states would enforce their sovereign rights over the marine
resources, i.e. tuna, in their respective EEZs. The Convention cre-
ated a unified Pacific voice backed by the technical support of the
Forum Fisheries Agency.
Article III of the Convention explicitly recognizes a coastal
state's sovereignty over its 200 nautical mile EEZ.47 The coastal
state's sovereignty is for the purpose of "exploring and exploiting,
42. South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, July 10, 1979,2 OCEAN
Y.B. 575 (1980) [hereinafter Convention]. The signatories to the Convention are
Australia, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands;
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Chris Hedley, ed., Internet Guide to International
Fisheries Law, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, OCEAN LAW, at
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/summaries/ffa.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2001).
For a discussion of the negotiation of the Convention, see Florian Guban, History
and Role of the Forum Fisheries Agency, in TUNA ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE
PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 245 (David J. Doulman, ed. 1987) [hereinafter History of
FFA].
43. Convention, supra note 42, art. III.
44. Id. arts. V, VII.
45. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 2, 56.
46. In particular, in 1974, the United States had repudiated its agreement
with the Congress of Micronesia to support the creation of the 200-mile EEZ and
coastal state regulation of tuna. See supra note 9.
47. Convention, supra note 42, art. III. Although Article III states that the
EEZ "may extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of
its territorial sea is measured," the Convention does not define territorial sea or
baseline.
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conserving and managing the living resources, including highly
migratory species."48 Unlike UNCLOS III, the Convention does
not define "exploring and exploiting," "conserving and managing,"
or "highly migratory species."49 Because the Convention was a re-
sponse to UNCLOS III, it is logical for these undefined terms to be
given the same meaning as they have in UNCLOS III. Once these
terms are defined, it is obvious that Article III of the Convention
was a clear message to all distant water fishing nations that Pa-
cific Island states have sovereign rights over the tuna50 in their
respective EEZs.
The economic value of sovereign rights over tuna are inchoate
without mechanisms by which to establish a meaningful allowable
catch, a prerequisite to entering into licensing agreements with
distant water fishing nations. In order to establish a unified nego-
tiating position with distant water fishing nations, and to enforce
sovereign rights, the Convention establishes these mechanisms
thereby allowing the parties economic realization of their sover-
eign rights. The Convention created the Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA),51 to provide the parties with the expertise needed to realize
the full economic potential of their EEZs. The FFA consists of the
Forum Fisheries Committee5 2 and a Secretariat.5 3 The Forum
Fisheries Committee provides policy and administrative guidance
to the FFA5 4 and a forum for consultation "on matters of common
48. Id.
49. Compare id. art. III, with UNCLOS III, supra note 4, arts. 61, 62, 64, an-
nex I.
50. See UNCLOS III, supra note 4, annex I.
51. Convention, supra note 42, art. I.
52. The Committee consists of a representative from each member of the FFA.
Membership to the FFA is limited to members of the South Pacific Forum and
other states or territories in the region agreed to by the members. Id. art. II. Be-
cause many Pacific island nations believed that the South Pacific Commission
"was perpetuating distasteful colonial relationships," the South Pacific Forum was
established in 1971 as an alternative to the South Pacific Commission, whose
members were the colonial governments of the United Kingdom, the United
States, Australia, France, and the Netherlands. KENT, supra note 7, at 55, 57.
Former colonial powers and territories that were not seeking independence were
excluded from membership. Id. at 57. The primary purpose of the Forum is to
promote economic development and regional cooperation of its members. Id. at 57-
58.
53. Convention, supra note 42, art. II.
54. Id. art. V.1(a).
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ccncern in the field of fisheries."55 The Committee is directed to
"promote intra-regional coordination and cooperation" in the areas
of fisheries management policy,56 "relations with distant water
fishing nations,"5 7 and "surveillance and enforcement. "5 8
In order to further its coordination effort and to provide tech-
nical assistance to the parties to the Convention, the FFA is di-
rected to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate information
regarding fisheries (tuna in particular), including biological data,5 9
management procedures, 60 legislation,6 1 and fishing agreements. 62
More importantly, the FFA maintains current information regard-
ing fish prices, trans-shipment, processing, and marketing.6 3 The
FFA provides technical assistance with regard to the development
of fisheries policies, negotiation of foreign fishing agreements, and
training of surveillance officers.64 In order to further FFA's useful-
ness to the parties, the parties are required to provide to the Secre-
tariat information relating to catch reports and information on
fishing operations within the parties' EEZ,6 5 information on fish-
ing operations of vessels under the parties' jurisdictions, 66 the par-
ties' fisheries laws and regulations, 67 and "relevant biological and
statistical data."68
Due to the cooperative efforts of its members, the FFA has suc-
cessfully fulfilled its purpose to provide the parties with assistance
negotiating foreign fishing agreements, developing fisheries man-
55. Id. art. V.1(b). Consultation on matters of common interest is a tradi-
tional dispute resolution mechanism used in most Pacific Island cultures.
Anthony J. Slatyer, Tuna and the Impact of the Law of the Sea, in TUNA ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 27, 31 (David J. Doulman, ed.
1987).
56. Convention, supra note 42, art. V.2(a).
57. Id. art. V.2(b).
58. Id. art. V.2(c).
59. Id. art. VII(a).
60. Id. art. VII(b).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. art. VII(c).
64. Id. art. VII(d).
65. Id. art. IX(a).
66. Id.
67. Id. art. IX(b).
68. Id. art. IX(c).
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agement plans, training surveillance personnel, and coordinating
surveillance and enforcement activities. 69
B. Nauru Agreement
Recognizing that the Convention was only the first step in at-
taining economic realization of sovereign rights over ocean re-
sources, the FSM, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Republic of Nauru, the Republic of Palau,
Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands executed the Nauru
Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisher-
ies of Common Interest (Nauru Agreement). 70 The Nauru Agree-
ment was executed on February 11, 1982, ten months prior to the
ratification of UNCLOS III1 While UNCLOS III negotiations
continued, the Pacific Island states were consolidating their posi-
tion against the distant water fishing nations that dominated the
UNCLOS III negotiations.
The signatories to the Nauru Agreement recognized their de-
pendence upon the beneficial exploitation of tuna for their eco-
nomic development and independence, 72 and wanted to coordinate
the management of fisheries within and among the respective is-
land states' EEZs such that the island people would be "assured of
69. For a discussion of the FFA's successes see History of FFA, supra note 42,
at 350-55; David J. Doulman, Prospects and Directions in the Tuna Fishery, in
TUNA ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 299, 300-01 (David
J. Doulman, ed. 1987).
70. Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisher-
ies of Common Interest, Feb. 11, 1982, http://oceanlaw.net/texts/nauru.htm [here-
inafter the Nauru Agreement]. For a discussion of the Nauru Agreement see
David J. Doulman, Fisheries Cooperation: The Case of the Nauru Group, in TUNA
ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 257 (David J. Doulman,
ed. 1987) [hereinafter Fisheries Cooperation].
71. Compare Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, (executed February 11, 1982),
with UNCLOS III, supra note 4, (ratified December 10, 1982).
72. See Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, pmbl. ("Mindful of their dependence,
as developing island States, upon the rational development and optimum utiliza-
tion of the living resources occurring within the Fisheries Zones and, in particular,
the common stocks of fish therein."). The parties reaffirmed the recognition of the
direct correlation between their economic independence and their ocean resources
in three treaties. See FSM Arrangement, supra note 29; The Second Multilateral
High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stock in the Western and Central Pacific, June 10-13, 1997 [hereinafter
Majuro Declaration], http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/majuro.htm; Convention on
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the West-
ern and Central Pacific Ocean, Sep. 5, 2000, http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/.
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receiving the maximum benefits from such resources."73 The pur-
pose of the Nauru Agreement was to strengthen the bargaining
power of the small island states in their negotiations with the in-
dustrialized and more powerful distant water fishing nations. The
parties to the Nauru Agreement believed that a united front would
prevent distant water fishing nations from pitting them against
each other during negotiation of foreign fishing access agreements.
Together, the parties to the Nauru Agreement control access to the
world's largest tuna resources, 74 and through the provisions of the
Nauru Agreement, exponentially increased their negotiating
power against distant water fishing fleets.
By creating unity among the island states, the Nauru Agree-
ment eliminated from the foreign fishing fleets' negotiation arsenal
the threat that the fleet would leave to do business with an island
state that would grant more favorable license terms and charge a
lesser access fee. The unity created by the Nauru Agreement in-
cludes priority access to fishing vessels of the parties over other
foreign fishing vessels, 75 "minimum, uniform terms and condi-
tions" for the issuance of licenses to foreign fishing vessels, 76 prin-
73. Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, pmbl; see also id. art. I ("The Parties
shall seek, without any derogation of their respective sovereign rights, to coordi-
nate and harmonize the management of fisheries with regard to common stocks
within the Fisheries Zones, for the benefit of their people.").
74. The combined EEZs of the parties equal approximately 14 million square
kilometers and historically, the large schools of tuna which foreign fishing fleets
seek to harvest are found within their EEZs. See Fisheries Cooperation, supra note
70, at 258-61.
75. Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, art. II(a). This article has been imple-
mented through the FSM Arrangement, the purpose of which is to promote greater
economic participation of the parties' nationals in the tuna fishery. FSM Arrange-
ment, supra note 70, art. II. The FSM Arrangement establishes a mechanism
whereby the vessels flagged by one of the parties to the Arrangement, which meet
particular criteria, can be issued a regional access license allowing the vessel ac-
cess to the EEZs of all of the parties to the FSM Arrangement. See id. arts. III, V,
VI.
76. Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, art. II(b). These minimum terms in-
clude possession of a license or permit by every foreign fishing vessel, the right to
place an observer on board the foreign fishing vessel, the maintenance by all for-
eign fishing vessels of a standardized log book containing fish catch reports, the
timely reporting of vessel movements, and standardized identification. Id.; see
also The Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforce-
ment in the South Pacific Region, July 9, 1992, art. IV(2), http://www.oceanlaw.
netltexts/niue.htm [hereinafter Niue Treaty]. The FSM has codified the minimum
terms in the Marine Resources Act of 2002. See FSM Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 404
(2001), http://www.fsmcongress.org/12congress/.
58 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:43
ciples by which access fees would be calculated, 77 and the
requirement that the "flag State or organizations having authority
over a foreign fishing vessel take such measures as are necessary
to ensure compliance with the relevant fisheries laws of the Par-
ties."78 The most powerful and effective provisions of the Nauru
Agreement are the Articles establishing the Regional Register for
Foreign Fishing Vessels (Regional Register).79 The Regional Reg-
ister is a registry of good standing maintained by the FFA.80 If a
foreign fishing vessel is not in good standing on the Regional Reg-
ister, no member state of the FFA will issue that vessel a foreign
fishing license."' The Regional Register has been a powerful en-
forcement mechanism for FFA member states.8 2
Recognizing that UNCLOS III would not provide realization of
economic benefits from ocean resources, Micronesians and other
77. Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, art. II(c)(i).
78. Id. art. II(c)(iv). This requirement became a seminal provision in the
treaty entered into between the United States and the parties to the Convention.
See Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States
and the Government of the United States of America, art. 1V (Apr. 2, 1987), http://
www.oceanlaw.net/texts/; see also FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enter., 8 FSM Intrm.
166 (Pon. 1997) (although not the owner or operator of the vessel, Ting Hong was
held criminally liable for vessel's violation of fisheries law where vessel licensed
under Ting Hong's foreign fishing agreement with FSM), http://www.fsmlaw.org/
fsm/decisions/. The parties have extended this duty to their own purse seine fleets.
See FSM Agreement, supra note 70, art. 12(1) ("Each party shall ensure, to the
fullest extent possible in accordance with its laws and regulations, that its fishing
vessels shall not engage in fishing within the exclusive economic or fisheries zone
of any other Party unless duly licensed under this Arrangement or under other
licensing arrangements.").
79. See Nauru Agreement, supra note 70, arts. III, V(b), V; see also Niue
Treaty, supra note 76, art. IV(2).
80. Niue Treaty, supra note 76, art. IV(2).
81. Id. The benefits of the Nauru Agreement were incorporated into the Niue
Agreement for the benefit of all FFA member states. See also FSM v. Hai Hsiang
No. 63, 7 FSM Intrm. 114, n.I (Chk. 1995) (FSM may deny foreign fishing permit if
vessel is not in good standing on Regional Register maintained by FFA); FSM Pub.
L. No. 12.034, § 109(4)(a) ("A [foreign fishing] permit shall be denied where: (a) the
application is made in respect of a foreign fishing vessel that does not have good
standing on the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels maintained by the
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency."), http://www.fsmcongress.org/12congress/.
82. Fisheries Cooperation, supra note 70, at 262 ("The Regional Register and
its sanctions have proven effective in enforcing compliance with the terms and con-
ditions of [distant water fishing nation's] . . . access agreements with [Pacific Is-
land] . . . countries. In this way the register has helped to reduce the costs of
administering agreements. The register has also reduced the incidence of illegal
fishing and facilitated the collection of fines . . ").
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Pacific Island states banded together through regional agreements
to establish mechanisms whereby the people of the Pacific would
be able to begin to realize economic benefits from the ocean re-
sources they had historically depended upon as an integral part of
their subsistence economy. Although the cooperation among Pa-
cific Island states, along with the technical assistance of the FFA,
provided Micronesians with some of the necessary tools to begin to
participate in fisheries, none of the regional agreements created
the enforcement mechanisms necessary to fully capture the eco-
nomic benefits of the EEZ. In order to capture these economic ben-
efits, each island state, including the FSM, needed to establish its
own enforcement mechanisms.
IV. FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
A. Background
In 1973, when negotiations for UNCLOS III began, the FSM
did not exist as a country.8 3 The States of Yap, Chuuk, and
Pohnpei8 4 of the FSM were separate administrative districts of the
United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered
by the United States. The Trust Territory Islands did not have a
vote during UNCLOS III negotiations, but in 1974, with the agree-
ment of the United States, the representatives of the Congress of
Micronesia attended negotiations as a separate delegation than
that of the United States.85 Micronesians followed the UNCLOS
III negotiations closely. Although Micronesians could not vote on
UNCLOS III and were not in a position to declare their own EEZs,
Micronesians took a number of positive steps to ensure that upon
the ratification of UNCLOS III, they were positioned to claim EEZs
and sovereign rights over the marine resources in their respective
EEZs.
Micronesians began the process of officially laying claim to
their ocean resources more than five years before the ratification of
83. The Federated States of Micronesia came into existence as a separate po-
litical state on July 12, 1979. The FSM did not obtain full sovereignty until 1986
upon ratification of the Compact of Free Association by the U.S. Senate.
84. The Trust Territory District of Ponape included the islands that now make
up the States of Pohnpei and Kosrae.
85. See FSM Congress' Chronology of Events in Micronesia, supra note 5;
KENT, supra note 7, at 43-44.
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UNCLOS III. In 1977, the Seventh Congress of Micronesia8 6 en-
acted Public Law No. 7-71 for the purposes of creating an "Ex-
tended Fishery Zone."87 Public Law No. 7-71 established the
Extended Fishery Zone consisting of the marine space from 12 to
200 nautical miles seaward from the baselines of each District's
islands.88 Public Law No. 7-71 was enacted at a time when
Micronesians were still negotiating their political status with the
United States. Recognizing each island group's right to political
self-determination and recognizing the economic importance of the
EEZ to each island group, Public Law No. 7-71 explicitly states
that any island group which becomes its own political entity shall
take its EEZ with it.s9
In 1975, the Trust Territory Islands convened their first Con-
stitutional Convention. The draft of the Constitution ratified by
the Districts of Yap, Truk and Ponape included an explicit declara-
tion of a 200-mile EEZ.90 The Constitution divided sovereign own-
ership between the FSM and the state governments by vesting the
FSM Congress with the power "to regulate the ownership, explora-
tion, and exploitation of natural resources within the marine space
of the Federated States of Micronesia beyond 12 miles from island
baselines"91 and vesting sovereignty over the territorial sea 92 in
the state governments. 93 Although the FSM Constitution became
86. The Congress of Micronesia was the legislative body for the United Na-
tions Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Chuuk v. Sec'y of Fin., 9 FSM Intrm.
424, 432 (App. 2000), http://www.fsmlaw.orgfsm/decisions/.
87. Pub. L. No. 7-71, § 1, 7th Cong. of Micro., 1st Spec. Sess. (1977). Public
Law No. 7-71 was signed into law by the Trust Territory High Commissioner on
October 18, 1977; its effective date was June 30, 1979.
88. Pub. L. No. 7-71, § 6(1), 7th Cong. of Micro., 1st Spec. Sess. (1977). The
effective date of section 6 was July 1, 1979. Prior to July 1, 1979, the territorial
sea was only three nautical miles in breadth. 52 T.T.C. §§ 53, 55 (1980 Ed.).
89. Pub. L. No. 7-71, § 1 codified as 52 T.T.C. § 58.
90. FSM CONST. art. I, § 1 ("Unless limited by international treaty obligations
assumed by the Federated States of Micronesia, or by its own act, the waters con-
necting the islands of the archipelago are internal waters regardless of dimen-
sions, and jurisdiction extends to a marine space of 200 miles measured outward
from appropriate baselines, the seabed, subsoil, water column, insular or continen-
tal shelves, airspace over land and water, and any other territory or waters belong-
ing to Micronesia by historic right, custom, or legal title.").
91. FSM CONST. art. IX, § 2(m).
92. The territorial sea is the ocean space from the island baselines outward 12
nautical miles. UNCLOS III, supra note 4, art. 3.
93. "The absence of an express grant of authority to the [FSM national gov-
ernment to regulate marine resources within twelve miles of island baselines indi-
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effective on July 12, 1979, three years prior to the ratification of
UNCLOS III, the FSM did not obtain its sovereignty until 1986
upon ratification of the Compact of Free Association with the
United States. Prior to gaining independence, the FSM had posi-
tioned itself to take full economic advantage of its EEZ upon the
international community's recognition of the FSM as a coastal na-
tion and of a coastal nation's sovereign right to its EEZ and the
marine resources therein.
B. FSM Exclusive Economic Zone and Territorial Sea
At its emergence as a coastal state within the international
community, the FSM claimed sovereignty over its EEZ and territo-
rial sea.94 Moreover, the framers of the FSM Constitution ensured
that Micronesians' historical claims to sovereignty over the territo-
rial sea and EEZ became the law of the FSM by including a transi-
tion clause in the FSM Constitution, which provides that a "statute
of the Trust Territory continues in effect except to the extent it is
inconsistent with this Constitution, or is amended or repealed."95
Thus, Public Law 7-71, a Trust Territory statute, became the law
of the FSM through the FSM Constitution's Transition Clause.
Those portions of Public Law 7-71 establishing sovereignty over
the territorial sea and the EEZ were codified in Title 18 of the FSM
Code.96 Having obtained international recognition of its sovereign
rights to the marine resources within its EEZ and having claimed
cates the framers' intention that states have control over these resources."
Pohnpei v. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 594, 598 (Pohnpei 1994), rev'd on
other grounds, 7 FSM Intrm. 456 (App. 1996), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/deci-
sions/; see also YAP STATE CONST. art XIII, § 5 ("The State recognizes traditional
rights and ownership of natural resources and areas within the marine space of
the State, within and beyond 12 miles from island baselines. No action may be
taken to impair these traditional rights and ownership, except the State Govern-
ment may provide for the conservation and protection of natural resources within
the marine space of the State within 12 miles from island baselines."). Accord
FSM v. Kotobuki Maru No. 3 (I), 6 FSM Intrm. 65, 69 (Pohnpei 1993) (stating that
"regulation of the 12 mile zone is presumably a state power, pursuant to article
VIII" of the FSM Constitution), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; FSM v. Oli-
ver, 3 FSM Intrm. 469, 473 (Pon. 1988) ("IFIramers intended the states to control
ownership and use of marine resources within [the 12 mile zone.]").
94. FSM CONST. art. I, § 1.
95. Id. art. XIV, § 1.
96. 18 F.S.M.C. §§ 103, 105 (1979), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/code/title/.
These provisions had previously been codified as sections 53 and 55 of Title 52 of
the Trust Territory Code. 52 T.T.C. §§ 53, 55 (1980).
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sovereignty over its territorial sea and EEZ, the FSM and the state
governments were now ready to implement their fisheries legisla-
tion in an effort to reap the economic benefits of the marine re-
sources within the EEZ and to protect the marine resources within
the territorial sea that support the local Micronesian subsistence
economy.
C. FSM Marine Resources Act of 1979
The FSM Interim Congress enacted the FSM's first fisheries
legislation, Public Law No. IC-3, which was later codified as Titles
18 and 24 of the FSM Code.9 7 The primary purpose of the 1979 Act
was to obtain economic benefits while at the same time promoting
conservation, management, and development of marine resources
within the FSM's EEZ.98 Although drafted and enacted prior to
the FSM's existence as a country, the 1979 Act made a good faith
attempt to comply with the FFA Convention and the Nauru Agree-
ment, both of which the FSM had acceded to prior to being recog-
nized as an independent state by the international community.
The 1979 Act created the Micronesian Maritime Authority
(Authority), which was charged with implementing and enforcing
the Act.99 The 1979 Act prohibited fishing within the EEZ except
97. The 1979 Act, with few amendments, remained in effect until March,
2002, when it was superseded by Public Law 12.034 (the 2002 Act). The 1979 Act
is still worthy of discussion, both for historical purposes and because all of the
reported decisions of the FSM Supreme Court interpret the 1979 Act. Moreover,
the thesis of this Article, that the due process rights of foreign nationals are being
violated, applies equally to the 1979 Act and the 2002 Act.
98. 24 F.S.M.C. § 101 ("The resources of the sea around the Federated States
of Micronesia are a finite but renewable part of the physical heritage of our people.
As the Federated States of Micronesia has only limited land-based resources, the
sea provides the primary means for the development of economic viability which is
necessary to provide the foundation for political stability. The resources of the sea
must be managed, conserved, and developed for the benefit of the people living
today and for the generations of citizens to come. For this reason, the harvesting
of this resource, both domestic and foreign, must be monitored, and when neces-
sary, controlled. The purpose of this title is to promote conservation, management,
and development of the marine resources of the Federated States of Micronesia,
generate the maximum benefit for the Nation from foreign fishing, and to promote
the development of a domestic fishing industry.").
99. Pub. L. No. IC-3, § 9. The Micronesian Maritime Authority was later
renamed the Micronesian Fisheries Authority (both entities are referred to as the
"Authority"). Pub. L. No. 11-57. The Authority was renamed again in Pub. L. No.
12.034 to the National Oceanic Resource Management Authority, effective March
8, 2002. Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 201.
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by permit or license issued pursuant to a foreign fishing agree-
ment.100 In an effort to fulfill the FSM's treaty obligations, the
1979 Act: (1) authorized, but did not mandate, that the Authority
deny the application for a fishing permit for a vessel not in good
standing on the Regional Registry;10 1 (2) authorized the Authority
to charge foreign vessels access fees;'0 2 (3) authorized the Author-
ity to develop an observer program; 0 3 and (4) required fishing ves-
sels fishing within the EEZ to report fish catch information to the
Authority. 0 4
The 1979 Act created enforcement mechanisms in addition to
the observer program. A person who violated the 1979 Act was
liable for civil penalties,10 5 criminal penalties,10 6 and forfeiture of
all property used in violation of the Act.' 0 7 The 1979 Act did not
distinguish between those violations of the Act that created civil
liability from those that created criminal liability.' 08 The same
underlying act could be, and often was, the basis for a civil penal-
ties action, a criminal action, and an in rem forfeiture action.l0 9 If
a person was found to have violated a provision of Section 501110 of
the 1979 Act, the FSM Supreme Court could impose a civil fine not
100. 24 F.S.M.C. §§ 103, 401.
101. Id. § 111(3)(b) ("A permit may be denied... where the application is made
in respect of a foreign fishing vessel, and such vessel does not have good standing
on the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels maintained by the South Pa-
cific Forum Fisheries Agency.") (emphasis added).
102. Id. §§ 113-15, 402.
103. Id. § 106(1)(b).
104. Id. § 116.
105. Id. § 502.
106. Id. § 503.
107. Id. §§ 504-06.
108. Id. § 501 (section 501 sets forth the acts prohibited under Title 24).
109. See also FSM v. Zhong Yuan Fishery Co., 9 FSM Intrm. 351 (Kos. 2000)
(stating that it is within prosecutor's discretion to simultaneously file both civil
and criminal cases against some defendants based on same incident), http://www.
fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/. Compare id. § 502(1) ("Any person who is found by the
Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia in a civil proceeding to have
committed an act prohibited by section 501 of this chapter shall be liable to the
Federated States of Micronesia for a civil penalty."), with id. § 503(1) ("A person is
guilty of an offense if he commits any act prohibited by section 501 of this chap-
ter."), and id. § 504(1) ("Any fishing vessel involved in the commission of any act
prohibited by section 501 of this chapter shall, along with its fishing gear, furni-
ture, appurtenances, stores, or cargo used, be forfeited to the Federated States of
Micronesia.").
110. Section 501 enumerates the acts prohibited under Title 24 of the FSM
Code. 24 F.S.M.C. § 501.
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to exceed $5 million for each violation."' Furthermore, each day
constitutes a separate violation. 1 2 If a person was found guilty of
committing an act prohibited by Section 501 of the 1979 Act, pur-
suant to Section 503 of the 1979 Act, the FSM Supreme Court was
required to impose a mandatory minimum criminal fine ranging
from $5,000 to $1 million. 1 13
Although the FSM Supreme Court has held that the 1979 Act
is constitutional on its face," 4 as discussed more fully in Sections
V and VI, the enforcement of the 1979 Act violates the principles of
due process embodied in the FSM Constitution." 5
D. FSM Marine Resources Act of 2002
In 2002, the FSM Congress enacted the Marine Resources Act
of 2002 (the 2002 Act), substantially amending Title 24 of the FSM
Code. 116 The stated purposes of the 2002 Act are "to ensure the
sustainable development, conservation and use of the marine re-
sources" in the FSM EEZ 117 and to ensure the FSM's compliance
with international law and its treaty obligations."18 The 2002 Act
satisfies the FSM's treaty obligations in a number of areas, includ-
ing the requirement that foreign fishing vessels obtain a license
issued pursuant to an access agreement, 119 that foreign fishing
vessels pay a fee or royalty for access to the EEZ,120 that foreign
fishing vessels maintain adequate fish catch records in English, 121
and the codification of minimum terms for fishing access agree-
111. Id. § 502(2). All fines must be paid in U.S. dollars. See 57 F.S.M.C. § 101
("Legal tender of the [FSM shall be the coins and currencies of the [United
States.]").
112. 24 F.S.M.C. § 502(2).
113. Id. § 503.
114. FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 555 (Chk. 1996), http://www.fsmlaw.
org/fsm/decisions/.
115. See infra sections V and VI.
116. Pub. L. No. 12.034 (2001), http://www.fsmcongress.org/12congress/.
117. Id. § 101(1).
118. FSM CONG. COMM. ON RES. & DEV., STANDING COMM. REP. No. 12-57, at 2
(12th Cong. 2002).
119. Pub. L. No. 12.034, §§ 103-05.
120. Compare Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 113(1), with Nauru Agreement, supra note
70, art. II(c)(i).
121. Compare Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 115, with Nauru Agreement, supra note 70,
art. WIOW(i).
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ments and licenses. 122 The 2002 Act also established the National
Oceanic Resource Management Authority (NORMA), 123 estab-
lished a procedure for the imposition of administrative penal-
ties,124 increased the number of and expanded the scope of
presumptions available to the FSM Secretary of Justice further re-
ducing the FSM's burden in prosecuting cases, 125 and substan-
tially reduced the minimum fine for violations of FSM law.126
The Executive Director of NORMA and the FSM Secretary of
Justice have the discretion to enforce the 2002 Act through the im-
position of newly created administrative penalties 127 or through
court proceedings. The in rem action, civil penalties action, and
criminal action are continued from the 1979 Act. The 2002 Act,
however, adds to the Secretary of Justice's enforcement arsenal six
new presumptions 128 and places the burden of proof on the person
alleged to be in violation of the act.' 29 While the 2002 Act makes
great strides in bringing the FSM into compliance with its interna-
122. Compare Pub. L. No. 12.034, §§ 110, 115, with Nauru Agreement, supra
note 70, art. 11(b).
123. Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 201.
124. Id. § 703.
125. Compare Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 706, with 24 F.S.M.C. § 515.
126. Compare Pub. L. No. 12.034, §§ 906-20, with 24 F.S.M.C. § 503.
127. Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 703. The administrative penalty process established
under the 2002 Act does not provide the person or vessel charged with violating
the Act a right to a hearing, thus raising potential due process concerns. See
Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 76 (Pon. 1985), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsn
decisions/; FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 555, 556 (Chk. 1996), http://www.
fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/. The Executive Director of NORMA does have the au-
thority to promulgate regulations for the administrative penalty process. Pub. L.
No. 12.034, § 204(1)(f). If the regulations include the right to notice and a hearing
to contest the imposition of the administrative penalty, the potential constitutional
defect may be cured. It is also possible that if the 2002 Act's administrative pen-
alty process is challenged, the FSM Supreme Court will, as it did in Ishizawa,
create the right to a hearing, thus judicially curing the constitutional defect. 2
FSM Intrm. 67.
128. Compare 24 F.S.M.C. § 515, with Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 706.
129. Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 707 (stating that it applies to any proceeding under
2002 Act). This transfer of the burden of proof applies to criminal proceedings, as
well as to civil proceedings, filed under the Act. See id. The transfer of the burden
of proof raises additional due process concerns which are not addressed in this
Article. See Ludwig v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 27, 35 (App. 1985) (noting that in crimi-
nal cases, the government has the burden of proof and must prove each element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; FSM
v. Ting Hong Oceanic Enters., 8 FSM Intrm. 166, 171 (Pon. 1997) (stating that the
government has burden of proof in case charging criminal violation of fisheries
law), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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tional treaty obligations, the enforcement mechanisms continue to
violate the principles of due process embodied in the FSM
Constitution. 130
E. Yap State Fishery Zone Act of 1980131
The State of Yap 132 has sovereign rights over the territorial
sea surrounding its islands. 133 Yap enforces its sovereign rights
over its territorial sea through the Yap State Fishery Zone Act of
1980 (Fishery Zone Act).' 34 The stated purpose of the Fishery
Zone Act is to "promote economic development and to manage and
conserve living sea resources" within the State's territorial sea.135
The Fishery Zone Act authorizes Yap Fishing Authority, a statuto-
rily created entity of the State, 136 to issue licenses to foreign fish-
ing vessels allowing them to fish within Yap's Fishery Zone. 137 To
date, Yap Fishing Authority has not issued a license to any foreign
fishing vessel.'13  Thus, the importance of the Fishery Zone Act is
not the grant of power to Yap Fishing Authority to collect foreign
130. See infra sections V and VI
131. The States of Chuuk and Kosrae have similar statutes. See 25 Draft
C.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., Legal Information System of the Federated States of
Micronesia, Chuuk State Code (Draft Version), http://www.fsmlaw.orgchuuk/code/
index.htm; 19 K.S.C. §§ 19.101 et seq., Legal Information System of the Federated
States of Micronesia, Kosrae State Code, http://www.fsmlaw.org/kosrae/code/
index.htm.
132. The State of Yap consists of more than 300 islands and atolls spread over
thousands of square miles of ocean. Yap's territorial sea is separated by large ex-
panses of ocean which are regulated by the FSM under Title 18 of the FSM Code
and Pub. L. No. 12.034. See Chuuk v. Sec'y of Fin., 9 FSM Intrm. 424 (App. 2000),
http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions.
133. See supra note 93.
134. 18 Y.S.C. § 201-18 (1980) [hereinafter Fishery Zone Act], available at Le-
gal Information System of the Federated States of Micronesia, Yap State Code,
http://www.fsmlaw.orglyap/code/index.htm.
135. Id. § 202.
136. Id. §§ 101 et seq.
137. Id. §§ 208, 210-11.
138. The author was legal counsel to Yap Fishing Authority from 1997 through
2001. This information was confirmed August 30, 2002. E-mail from Mike Gaan,
Chief of the Division of Commerce and Industry, Department of Resources and
Development, State of Yap to Kathleen M. Burch, Professor of Legal Writing,
Roger Williams University School of Law (Aug. 29, 2002, 21:59 EST) (on file with
author). The fact that Yap Fishing Authority, a state agency, has not issued any
foreign fishing licenses since its creation in 1979 is consistent with the Yapese
position that marine resources are private property, the ownership of which is de-
termined under custom and tradition. See YAP STATE CONST. art. XIII, §§ 5, 6.
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fishing fees,139 but the prohibition of foreign fishing without a per-
mit 140 and the enforcement provisions. 141
The Fishery Zone Act authorizes the Attorney General to pros-
ecute illegal fishing cases. 142 If a vessel engages in a prohibited
act as defined in section 212,143 the Attorney General may file a
civil penalties action,'" a criminal action,145 and an in rem forfei-
ture action.146 As in the 1979 Act and the 2002 Act, the same un-
derlying violation can be, and usually is, the basis for the civil
penalties action, the criminal action, and the in rem forfeiture ac-
tion. While each day is considered a separate violation, 147 the
Fishery Zone Act does not establish mandatory minimum civil pen-
alties' 48 or criminal fines. 149
Over the past ten years, the majority of the foreign fishing ves-
sels caught illegally fishing within Yap's boundaries' 50 were
caught fishing in Yap's Fishery Zone by citizens of the State of
Yap, either in their official capacity as government employees or in
their capacity as ordinary citizens. Yap received approximately
139. 18 Y.S.C. § 211(g).
140. Id. §§ 211(a), 212.
141. Id. §§ 213-15.
142. Id. § 217(a).
143. The prohibited acts listed in section 212 are not coextensive with the pro-
hibited acts listed in section 501 of the 1979 Act or section 906 of the 2002 Act.
Compare 18 Y.S.C. § 212, with 24 F.S.M.C, § 501 (1979), and Pub. L. No. 12.034,
§ 906 (2002).
144. 18 Y.S.C. § 213. Proceeds collected as civil penalties are divided equally
between the State and the municipality in whose boundaries the illegal fishing
occurred. Id. § 213(c). The municipality must use the funds to "maintain, develop,
and protect" marine resources. Id.
145. Id. § 214. Criminal fines are deposited in the State Treasury. 13 Y.S.C.
§ 501 (stating that all revenues shall be deposited in the Yap State General Fund).
146. 18 Y.S.C. § 215. The net proceeds from forfeiture actions are divided
equally between the state and the "persons whose traditional fishing rights have
been violated" by the illegal fishing. Id. § 215(d).
147. Id. §§ 213(a), 214(d), (e).
148. Id. § 213(a) (stating that "the civil penalty shall not exceed $75,000.00 for
each violation").
149. Id. § 214. Criminal fines range from $50,000.00 to $250,000.00. Id.
§ 214(b), (c). The one exception to the mandatory fine is a violation of the waste
holding tank requirement. See id. § 214(e) (noting that failure for a vessel with
living quarters to have a waste holding tank of at least two weeks capacity is "pun-
ishable by a fine of $25,000.00").
150. See FSM CONST. art. I, § 2 (State includes the islands corresponding to the
Trust Territory District and marine space to the equidistant point of the adjacent
state) and YAP STATE CONST. art. XI (identifying island groups of state).
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$1.1 million from enforcing the Fishery Zone Act between 1988 and
1996.151 The enforcement of the Fishery Zone Act, however, raises
the same due process concerns as does the enforcement of the 1979
and 2002 FSM Marine Resources Acts because in rem forfeiture
actions brought under both the Yap and the FSM Acts are gov-
erned by the procedure created by the FSM Supreme Court. 152
F. Illegal Fishing153
Authorized surveillance officers may be found aboard patrol
vessels, fishing vessels operated by Yap Fishing Authority, and ci-
vilian passenger ferries.' 54 A foreign fishing vessel can, however,
be stopped and boarded by individuals who do not appear to be
aboard surveillance vessels and who are likely not in uniform. A
marine surveillance officer may stop and search any vessel regard-
less of whether the officer suspects that the vessel is engaged in
criminal activity.155 Foreign fishing vessels are usually arrested
hundreds of miles from the state capital and the nearest judicial
151. Robbe Burch, Yap Port Authority: Financial Analysis, Sea Port Division
(Dec. 9, 1997) (unpublished report of the Division of Commerce and Industry, State
of Yap) (on file with author).
152. M/V Hai Hsiang #36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456 (App. 1996) (stating
that the FSM Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in illegal fishing cases),
http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsn-decisions.
153. The information contained in this section is based upon the author's
prosecution of foreign fishing vessels charged with violating the Fishery Zone Act.
154. Only an authorized surveillance officer may arrest a vessel. 18 Y.S.C.
§ 217(b) (1980); 24 F.S.M.C. § 513 (1979); Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 603. In November,
1995, after marine surveillance training, the Yap Attorney General authorized and
appointed employees of Yap State Public Safety (fire and police), the Division of
Marine Resources of the Department of Resources and Development, the Division
of Marine Transportation of the Department of Public Works, employees of Yap
Fishing Authority, the officers and crew of the Pawlulap (surveillance vessel), and
the officers and crew of the MicroSpirit (passenger ferry), as Yap State Marine
Surveillance Officers. 18 Y.S.C. § 217(b) (stating that the Attorney General must
authorize and appoint marine surveillance officers). The 1995 marine surveillance
training was conducted by the author. Documentation of the training is available
in the Yap State Office of Attorney General.
155. 18 Y.S.C. § 217(b)(1)(B); 24 F.S.M.C. § 513(1)(b)(i); Pub. L. No. 12.034,
§ 603 (1) (a), (c), (e), (f). Vessel searches have been justified on various grounds
including border searches, administrative inspection of a highly regulated indus-
try, and exigent circumstances. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 74 (Pon.
1985) (citing U.S. authorities), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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officer. 156 The arrest and prosecution of one foreign fishing vessel
can cost the state thousands of dollars. 157
It is not uncommon for foreign vessels arrested for illegal fish-
ing to be seized without a warrant on the open seas.158 By the time
the vessel arrives in port, the state has already filed an action in
rem against the vessel and the fish on board the vessel, 59 an
emergency ex parte motion for sale of the fish,' 60 a civil penalties
action against the owner and operators of the vessel, including the
captain and master,' 6 ' and a criminal action against the operators
of the vessel - in particular the captain, master, and agent of the
vessel. 16 2 The in rem action and the civil penalties action are filed
156. See FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708, 7 FSM Intrm. 300 (Kos. 1995) ("Many
FSM seizures take place on the high seas, and vessels are often arrested at outer
islands."), http:l/www.fsmlaw.org/fsmdecisions. The FSM Supreme Court main-
tains chambers in the capital of each state. The Yap State Court maintains cham-
bers in Colonia, Yap.
157. In In re Kuan Hsing 182 & An Unknown Quantity of Fish, the vessel was
arrested by the crew of the MicroSpirit, Yap's passenger ferry, within twelve miles
of Elato atoll. 7 FSM Intrm. 465 (Yap 1996), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/deci-
sions/. Elato does not have sufficient land mass to accommodate an air strip. The
crew of the MicroSpirit had to pilot the vessel and the MicroSpirit to Woleai, more
than 100 miles away. Police officers and personnel to crew the vessel were flown
via a chartered flight from Yap to Woleai to escort the vessel to Colonia, Yap.
Upon arrival in Tomil Harbor, Colonia, Yap, the vessel was secured by a 24-hour
police watch until bond was posted. The cost of arrest was more than $50,000.00.
Documentation is available in the Yap State Attorney General's Office.
158. During the author's six years in Yap, there was only one case in which a
warrant was issued before seizure. But see FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (II), 7 FSM Intrm.
555 (Chk. 1996).
159. See 18 Y.S.C. § 215.
160. See id. § 215(f). In order to maintain the commercial value of the fish
seized, the fish are .usually off-loaded and sold as soon as possible. The proceeds
from the sale of fish are deposited into a savings account with the Bank of FSM.
The signatory to the account is the presiding judge and the clerk of the court.
161. See id. § 213.
162. See id. § 214. The FSM Supreme Court has acknowledged the govern-
ment's "prosecutorial discretion to [simultaneously] file both the civil and criminal
cases" against the same defendants arising out of the same illegal fishing incident
in violation of fisheries law. FSM v. Zhong Yuan Fishery Co., 9 FSM Intrm. 351
(Kos. 2000), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsndecisions/. The FSM Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue of whether assessment of fines in the criminal action and
forfeiture of the vessel and fish in the in rem action based on the same conduct is a
violation of the prohibition against excessive fines. Both the FSM Constitution
and the Yap State Constitution contain prohibitions against excessive fines. See
FSM CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 8; YAP STATE CONST. art. II, §§ 6, 7. The excessive fines
issue was raised but not properly preserved in FSM v. Cheng Chia-A (II), 7 FSM
Intrm. 205, 218-19 (Pon. 1995), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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in the Trial Division of the FSM Supreme Court,163 while the
criminal action is filed in the Trial Division of the State Court for
the State of Yap. 164
The defendants are entitled to a probable cause hearing in the
criminal action 165 pending before the state court and a probable
cause hearing in the in rem action 166 pending before the FSM Su-
preme Court. Usually, the owner of the vessel retains counsel to
represent all parties charged with illegal fishing. When counsel is
from off-island, as is commonly the case, the probable cause hear-
ing is delayed until counsel's arrival. At defense counsel's election,
the probable cause hearing is usually (and only) held in the in rem
action. 16 7
163. "The trial division of the [FSM] Supreme Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction in ... admiralty or maritime cases." FSM CONST. art. XI, § 6(a). See
also M/V Hai Hsiang No. 36 v. Pohnpei, 7 FSM Intrm. 456 (App. 1996) (stating
that the in rem action and civil penalties action against commercial fishing vessel
and owner for violation of state fishing law within state waters is within the exclu-
sive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the FSM Supreme Court); Fed. Bus.
Dev. Bank v. S/S Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 374 (App. 1990) (stating that the
FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all maritime cases), http://
www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; Weilbacher v. Kosrae, 3 FSM Intrm. 320 (App.
1988) (noting that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the FSM is similar to
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the United States), http://www.fsmlaw.org/
fsm/decisions/; 18 Y.S.C. § 215(b) ("A court of competent jurisdiction in the State
shall have jurisdiction" in the in rem proceeding.).
164. 4 Y.S.C. § 124 ("The Trial Division of the State Court shall have original
jurisdiction to try all causes, civil and criminal, except those matters which fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Federated States
Micronesia.").
165. YAP STATE R. CRIM PRO. R. 5.1, http://www.fsmlaw.orglyap/rules/crim.
htm.
166. FSM v. M.T. HL Achiever (III), 7 FSM Intrm. 256, 257 (Chk. 1995) (stat-
ing that "a post-seizure hearing is required by the constitutional guarantee of due
process"), http://www.fsmlaw.orgfsm/decisions/.
167. Arguably, a defendant may only be entitled to one probable cause hearing.
Pohnpei v. M/V Zhong Yuan Yu No. 606, 6 FSM Intrm. 464 (Pon. 1994), http://
www.fsmlaw.org/fsn/decisions/. In M1 V Zhong Yuan Yu No. 606, on defendant's
petition to remove the action from state court, the FSM Supreme Court abstained
from taking jurisdiction over the case and remanded the case back to the state
court because the state court had already held a probable cause hearing and en-
tered substantive orders in the case. Id. at 464. Citing the rule on removal, the
FSM Supreme Court stated that defendants would not be entitled to a new proba-
ble cause hearing if the Court did exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 466. There is no
reported decision in which either the FSM Supreme Court or a state court has
addressed the issue of whether a defendant would be entitled to a probable cause
hearing in the in rem action pending before the FSM Supreme Court and a sepa-
rate probable cause hearing in the criminal action pending in the state court when
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At the probable cause hearing, the State is allowed to estab-
lish probable cause through reliable hearsay evidence. 168 Because
of the relaxed rules of evidence, usually only one surveillance of-
ficer testifies. 169 The surveillance officer's testimony is based upon
the collective knowledge of all of the individuals involved in the
arrest. The surveillance officer testifies as to the location of the
vessel when it was illegally fishing, the activity of the crew that led
the officer to believe that the vessel was illegally fishing, the condi-
tion of the fish on board the vessel, the evidence seized, and the
procedure used to seize the vessel and crew. The testifying officer
need not have witnessed the illegal activity; need not have boarded
the vessel to determine if the vessel was engaged in illegal fishing;
and need not have been involved in the search or seizure of the
vessel. 170 Although the vessel's attorney is given the opportunity
to cross-examine the testifying officer, the court usually finds prob-
able cause. 17'
In order to obtain release of the vessel once probable cause is
found, the vessel owner can post a bond. The vessel is not released
both actions are premised upon the same illegal conduct of the defendant. Id. The
availability of separate probable cause hearings raises the specter of inconsistent
rulings being entered based on the same evidence by the two different courts. Id.
Because the witnesses can not testify in two separate proceedings at the same
time, one probable cause hearing will necessarily conclude first, and as the crimi-
nal action and the in rem forfeiture action are premised on the same event, it is
likely that the prevailing party, usually the State, will raise the issue of collateral
estoppel. See Berman v. FSM Supreme Court (I), 7 FSM Intrm. 8 (App. 1995),
Mid-Pacific Constr. Co. v. Semes (II), 6 FSM Intrm. 180 (Pon. 1993) (recognizing
doctrine of collateral estoppel); Nahnken of Nett v. United States (III), 6 FSM
Intrm. 508 (Pon. 1994) (same). It should be noted, however, that individual de-
fendants in the criminal action are not always the same parties who have standing
in the in rem forfeiture action. Thus, the court may be unwilling to collaterally
estop a defendant from raising the issue of probable cause.
168. FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708, 7 FSM Intrm. 300, 303 (Kos. 1995), http://
fsmlaw.org/fsmldecisions/.
169. See id. at 305. The State of Yap usually has an officer who was involved
with some aspect of the arrest of the vessel testify at the probable cause hearing.
The FSM has relied upon affidavits of surveillance officers instead of testimony
before the court. See id.; FSM v. Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, 6 FSM Intrm. 584 (Pon.
1994), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsmdecisions/.
170. The choice of which officer will testify on behalf of the State at the proba-
ble cause hearing is based on practical considerations such as whether the officer
is fluent in English, whether the officer can read and interpret nautical charts,
whether the officer can identify fish species, whether the officer has prior experi-
ence testifying, and whether the officer is related to the judge.
171. During the years 1995-2001, the FSM Supreme Court found probable
cause in all cases brought by the State of Yap.
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until the bond is posted. 172 Settlement negotiations can begin
within hours of the arrest of the vessel, and it is possible for a set-
tlement to be reached before any litigation is filed. 173 Most cases
filed by the State of Yap conclude in a settlement equal to the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the fish, the insured value of the vessel, and
the cost of arrest, including the cost of securing the vessel in
port. 174 The economics of the fishing industry dictate that the ves-
sel and crew be released from custody and return to the fishing
grounds as quickly as possible. Once the vessel and crew are re-
leased, they are not likely to return for trial. 175 From August of
1995 through August of 2001, not one illegal fishing case went to
trial in the State of Yap; all cases were either settled before litiga-
tion was filed or after the probable cause hearing. 76
In order to comply with its treaty obligations,' 7 7 the FSM re-
quires the State to report the identity of the vessel caught illegally
fishing, the name of the vessel's owners, the name of the vessel's
captain, the nature of the violation, and the resolution of the illegal
172. In order for a court in the FSM to maintain in rem jurisdiction, "the vessel
must be seized and be under the control of the court." Kosrae v. MIV Voea
Lomipeau, 9 FSM Intrm. 366, 370 (Kos. 2000) (discussing the court's dismissal of a
complaint against a vessel because the vessel had not been seized and was not in
the FSM), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/. Accord Moses v. M.V. Sea Chase,
10 FSM Intrm. 45, 51-52 (Chk. 2001) (stating that the vessel must be in jurisdic-
tion of court for in rem action); In re Kuang Hsing No. 127, 7 FSM Intrm. 81, 82
(Chk. 1995) (dismissing in rem action where the vessel was never seized and no
bond was posted), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/. See also Pub. L. No.
12.034, §§ 801(2), 807. On occasion, a prosecutor has not had the foresight to re-
quire the posting of a bond before agreeing to release the vessel. See Ting Hong
Oceanic Enters. v. FSM, 7 FSM Intrm. 471 (App. 1996) (discussing the govern-
ment's release of a vessel and the individual defendants before procuring a bond),
http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
173. See Settlement Agreement between State of Yap and Fukuichi Maru No.
85, Fukuichi Fisheries Co., Ltd., Akio Oyama, and Japan Far Seas Purse Seine
Fishing Association (Aug. 6, 1996) (unpublished agreement, on file with author).
174. The State of Yap structures the settlement agreement such that, after re-
imbursement to the State of the cost of arrest and prosecution, at least fifty per-
cent of the settlement is designated as criminal fines and the remainder is
designated as payment in lieu of forfeiture. See supra notes 146-47. To date, the
largest payment made pursuant to 18 Y.S.C. § 215(d) was $125,000.00 paid to the
traditional chief of Rumung. Documentation is available in the Yap State Office of
Attorney General.
175. Ting Hong Oceanic Enters. v. FSM, 7 FSM Intrm. 471, 475 (App. 1996)
(discussing situation where vessel and two members of the crew left the FSM
before trial and did not return), http://www.fsmlaw.orgfsm/decisions/.
176. Documentation is available in the Yap State Office of Attorney General.
177. Niue Treaty, supra note 76, art. IV(2).
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fishing charges to the FFA for documentation on the Regional Reg-
ister. For vessels prosecuted by the FSM, the FSM is required to
report the same information to the FFA for documentation on the
Regional Register. Because the settlement is entered after the
probable cause hearing, but before a trial on the merits, and in-
cludes payment of criminal fines and cash in lieu of forfeiture, the
information reported to the FFA appears to indicate that the vessel
was guilty of illegal fishing when, in fact, the vessel owner may
have settled the litigation not based on guilt but based on the eco-
nomic need to have the vessel and crew return to the fishing
grounds.178
While the receipt of settlement funds is an economic benefit to
the State, the prosecution of individuals for illegal fishing in viola-
tion of their rights to due process negates the short-term economic
benefit of the settlement payment. The prosecution of foreign fish-
ing vessels, their owners, and operators in proceedings that are
fundamentally unfair lead those same persons to move their in-
vestment to a jurisdiction that provides, or is at least perceived to
provide, a more equitable system of adjudicating disputes. Thus,
while the State may receive a lump sum cash payment in settle-
ment, it stands to lose the future income stream and on-shore in-
vestment, including local job creation, from a viable fishing
industry. 179
178. The practice in Yap has been for the settlement to explicitly state that the
settlement is not an admission of liability by the vessel owner and captain. See
Settlement Agreement in Yap v. Koueki Suisan Guam Co., Civil Action No. 1995-
3031, FSM Supreme Court, Trial Division, June 19, 1998 - Yap State ("Waiver and
release of the Settlement Funds by Tuna Industrial Co. and Koueki does not con-
stitute an admission by either Tuna Industrial Co. or Koueki of liability for the
alleged fishing incident which resulted in the filing of the Civil Penalties Action,
the Forfeiture Action, and the Criminal Action."). The settlement agreement, how-
ever, is not forwarded to the FFA.
179. In 1995, Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises was the largest fishing operator
in the FSM. FSM v. Cheng Chia-W (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 205, 218 (Pon. 1995), http://
www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/. Ting Hong accounted for 60% of the FSM catch
and exported $90 million of sashimi grade tuna to the Japanese market. Id. After
a $1.2 million criminal fine was assessed against it in FSM v. Ting Hong Oceanic
Enterprises, the company left the FSM. 8 FSM Intrm. 166 (Pon. 1997). Ting Hong
Oceanic Enterprises' exit from Yap left the State with no foreign on-shore fisheries
investment and no fishing fleet based in Yap. To date, Yap has not been able to
attract comparable foreign on-shore fisheries investment.
2002]
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V. DUE PROCESS
A. Due Process in the Federated States of Micronesia
The FSM and its constituent states adopted the concept of due
process from the United States Constitution.180 Article V, Section
3 of the FSM Constitution states "[a] person may not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... ."181 Simi-
larly, the Yap State Constitution states that "[no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ,"12 Because a vessel owner's right to due process under
the FSM Constitution and the Yap State Constitution are co-exten-
sive,'8 3 only the FSM Constitution will be addressed.
Because the FSM Constitution borrowed the concept of due
process from the United States, the courts of the FSM have explic-
itly stated that the due process jurisprudence of the FSM has been
built upon the principles of due process established by the United
States Supreme Court.'8 4 Micronesian due process consists of both
180. FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 555, 556-57 (Chk. 1996) (stating that
the due process provision of the FSM Constitution was derived from the due pro-
cess provision of the United States Constitution), http://www.fsmlaw.orgfsm/deci-
sions/.
181. FSM CONST. art. IV, § 3.
182. YAP STATE CONST. art II, § 4, cl. 1; see also POHNPEI STATE CONST. art. 4,
§ 4 ("No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Private property may not be taken except for a public purpose with just com-
pensation."); CHUUK CONST. art. III, § 2 ("No person may be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law."); KosRAE CONST. art. II, § 1(b) ("A
person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.").
183. Thomson v. George, 8 FSM Intrm. 517, 523 (App. 1998) (noting that where
the language of the due process clause in a state constitution is the same as the
FSM Constitution, the due process clauses are identical in meaning and scope)
(citing Alik v. Kosrae Hotel Corp., 5 FSM Intrm. 294, 297 (Kos. 1992)), http://www.
fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
184. See, e.g., Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 76 (Pon. 1985) (stating
that because FSM Constitution borrowed due process from U.S. Constitution, FSM
courts look to U.S. law for guidance), http://www.fsmlaw.prgfsndecisions/; Paulus
v. Pohnpei, 3 FSM Intrm. 208, 221 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1987) (defining and explaining
due process), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; see also Tammow v. FSM, 2
FSM Intrm. 53, 56-57 (App. 1985) (stating that where framers of FSM Constitu-
tion borrowed language of the U.S. Constitution, it is "presumed that the phrases
so borrowed were intended to have the same meaning given to them by the Su-
preme Court of the United States."); Ludwig v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 27, 35 (App.
1985) (stating that because FSM due process clause is based on U.S. Constitution,
look to interpretation of U.S. Constitution for guidance), http://www.fsmlaw.org
fsm/decisions/.
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procedural due process and substantive due process.18 5 Procedural
due process includes the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.186 Substantive due process encompasses notions of funda-
mental fairness. 18 7
As persons whose "substantial interests," either in the vessel
or in their own liberty, will be affected by the proceedings, the own-
ers, captains, and agents of foreign fishing vessels are entitled to
due process.188 Moreover, foreign nationals are persons within the
meaning of the due process clause,' 8 9 and it cannot be disputed
that a fishing vessel is property within the meaning of the due pro-
cess clause. 190 And clearly, the restriction of a person to a particu-
lar geographic area' 91 pending resolution of the in rem forfeiture
action and criminal charges is a deprivation of liberty. 92 The pro-
tections of the due process clause are applicable to both the State's
and the FSM's prosecution of illegal fishing cases, whether prose-
cuted as in rem forfeiture actions in the FSM Supreme Court or as
criminal actions in either the FSM Supreme Court or a state court.
Although a defendant's due process rights are triggered in
both the in rem forfeiture action and the criminal action, because
185. Paulus, 3 FSM Intrm. at 221 ("Procedural due process relates to the requi-
site characteristics of proceedings tending toward a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property and thus makes it necessary that a person whom it is sought to deprive of
such a right must be given notice of this fact; in other words, he must be given
notice of the proceedings against him in that regard, he must be given an opportu-
nity to defend himself before a tribunal or office having jurisdiction of the cause,
and the problem of the propriety of this deprivation, under the circumstances
presented, must be solved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.").
186. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 76 (Pon. 1985).
187. Id.
188. Any person whose "substantial interests" will be affected by the proceed-
ing is entitled to due process. Louis v. Kutta, 8 FSM Intrm. 228, 230 (Chk. 1998)
(citing 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 835 (1979)), http://www.fsmlaw.org/
fsm/decisions/.
189. Berman v. FSM Supreme Court (I), 5 FSM Intrm. 364, 366 (Pon. 1992),
httpJ/www.fsmlaw.orgfsm/decisions/.
190. Ishizawa, 2 FSM Intrm. at 75 ("Seizure of a fishing vessel has especially
profound implications. A valuable, potentially productive asset is rendered useless
to the owners, depriving them of potential profits as well as their use of the
vessel.").
191. Individual defendants charged with criminally violating 18 Y.S.C. § 214
are not usually detained in the Yap State jail but are released with conditions to
reside at a particular location and to surrender their passports. See UNCLOS III,
supra note 4, art. 292(c) (requiring the prompt release of individuals and vessels
upon posting of adequate bond).
192. Ishizawa, 2 FSM Intrm. at 72, 75.
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defendants usually request the probable cause hearing in the in
rem action and not the criminal action, the due process problems
identified in this Article are unique to the in rem forfeiture action
and to the forfeiture procedures established by the FSM Supreme
Court. The due process concerns arise because of the nature of the
fishing industry. The owner of the vessel is interested in obtaining
the release of the asset, the vessel. The captain and fish master
charged in the criminal action, unless they are also the owners, are
replaceable. The economic incentive is to move forward in the in
rem forfeiture action, obtaining release of the vessel in order to
maintain the owner's financial viability. The judicially created
post-seizure hearing in the in rem forfeiture action does not take
into account these realities of the fishing industry: this failure trig-
gers due process concerns. In order to adequately assess the due
process concerns, two questions must be addressed: (1) what con-
stitutional due process rights do foreign nationals have; and (2)
why are the protections established by the FSM Supreme Court
insufficient to satisfy constitutional due process?
B. Procedural Due Process
The 1979 Act, the 2002 Act, and the Yap Fishery Zone Act are
all silent with regard to a defendant's procedural rights in in rem
forfeiture actions.193 The FSM Supreme Court, however, has not
found this deficiency to be constitutionally fatal.'9 4 Instead, apply-
ing the rule of statutory construction that statutes should be con-
strued to be constitutional, the FSM Supreme Court created the
right to a prompt post-seizure hearing. 195 This hearing has come
to be known as a probable cause hearing.
As early as 1985, the FSM Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a vessel owner was entitled to a post-seizure hear-
193. 24 F.S.M.C. §§ 504-509 (1979); Pub. L. No. 12.034, §§ 801-08; 18 Y.S.C.
§ 215.
194. FSM v. M.T. HL Achiever (III), 7 FSM Intrm. 256 (Chk. 1995), http://
www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
195. See FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (11), 7 FSM Intrm. 555, 556 (Chk. 1996) (stating
that a defendant is entitled to a post-seizure hearing even though the statute is
silent as to a post-seizure hearing), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/; FSM v.
M.T. HL Achiever (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 256, 257 (Chk. 1995) (same); Ishizawa, 2
FSM Intrm. at 76-77 (stating that the FSM Constitution requires that, at a mini-
mum, the government must establish probable cause for seizure of a vessel at
prompt post-seizure hearing), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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ing. 19 6 In Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 97 the vessel, Meiho Maru #77, was
en route from New Zealand, where it had been squid fishing, to its
home port in Japan when it ran aground on the reef fringing Nga-
tik Atoll, an outlying island of Pohnpei, on April 29th.198 On May
14th, after the vessel was removed from the reef and towed to
Pohnpei harbor, Pohnpei arrested the vessel for illegally fishing
and instructed the captain and crew not to leave the island. 99
Pohnpei did not obtain an arrest warrant and did not file any
charges against the vessel, captain, or crew. 200 The owners of the
vessel filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of the crew and a
civil action requesting immediate release of the vessel, alleging
that Pohnpei did not have probable cause to arrest either the crew
or the vessel. 20 The FSM Supreme Court instructed Pohnpei that
before it could restrict the movements of the crew it must establish
probable cause and obtain an arrest warrant.20 2 With regard to
the seizure of the vessel, Pohnpei argued that it did not need prob-
able cause to seize the vessel and that no judicial determination of
whether Pohnpei had grounds to arrest the vessel need be made
until trial.203 Rejecting Pohnpei's argument, the FSM Supreme
Court held that due to the exigent nature of fisheries, the govern-
ment could seize a fishing vessel without a warrant so long as the
government had probable cause to believe that the fishing vessel
had violated a fisheries law.20 4 The Court went on to state that the
owner of the vessel was entitled to a prompt post-seizure hearing
at which the government is required to establish probable
cause.20 5 Although the Court chastised Pohnpei for failing to file
charges and failing to obtain a judicial determination for more
than three days after the seizure of the vessel, the Court left open
the question of whether a substantial delay by the government in
requesting a post-seizure hearing violates due process. 20 6
196. Ishizawa, 2 FSM Intrm. 67 (Pon. 1985).
197. 2 FSM Intrm. 67 (Pon. 1985).
198. Id. at 70.
199. Id. at 71-72.
200. Id. at 72.
201. Id. at 72-73.
202. Id. at 72.
203. Id. at 76.
204. Id. at 77.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 76 n.9. The FSM Supreme Court still has not addressed this issue.
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Eleven years later, in FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (II),207 the FSM Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of whether the forfeiture provi-
sions of the 1979 Act 208 were constitutional. On July 5, 1995, a
warrant was issued for the arrest of a vessel, a fuel tanker, for
illegally bunkering fishing vessels in the EEZ without a fishing
permit. 20 9 On the same day, the FSM filed an in rem forfeiture
action against the vessel and fuel and a civil penalties action
against the owner, agent, and other parties. 210 On July 17, 1995,
at a hearing where the defendants were represented by counsel,
the Court found probable cause. 21' Defendant Skico, Ltd. chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the forfeiture provisions of the 1979
Act based on the fact that the Act does not specifically provide de-
fendant with a post-seizure hearing, nor notice of that hearing. 212
The FSM Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutional on
its face.21 3 The Court also refused to adopt a rule requiring the
government to provide immediate notice to defendants of a right to
a post-seizure hearing.21 4 The Court found that defendant had
been afforded procedural due process when it was granted a proba-
ble cause hearing. 215 Since the FSM Supreme Court's ruling in
Ishizawa, it has been well-established that when a vessel has been
seized for illegal fishing, the property owner is entitled to a proba-
ble cause hearing.
C. Substantive Due Process
In addition to the judicially created right to a probable cause
hearing, the FSM Supreme Court has established minimum sub-
stantive due process requirements in an effort to ensure that the
207. 7 FSM Intrm. 555 (Chk. 1996).
208. 24 F.S.M.C. §§ 504-09. The forfeiture provisions of the 2002 Act and the
Yap Fishery Zone Act are similar to the forfeiture provisions of the 1979 Act. Com-
pare id., with Pub. L. No. 12.034, §§ 801-08, and Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 191(c).
209. The definition of fishing includes the provision of services to fishing ves-
sels, including bunkering. 24 F.S.M.C. § 102(22)(g).
210. Skico, Ltd. (II), 7 FSM Intrm. at 556.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 557.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. In FSM v. M.T. HL Achiever (III), an opinion in the same case (Civil
Action No. 1995-1012), the FSM Supreme Court held that "a post-seizure hearing
is required by the constitutional guarantee of due process." 7 FSM Intrm. 256, 257
(Chk. 1995), http://www.fsmlaw.orgfsnldecisions/.
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determination of probable cause at the post-seizure hearing is fun-
damentally fair. The minimal requirements for substantive due
process fall into three categories: Probable Cause, Burden of Proof,
and Evidentiary Standards.
1. Probable Cause
Once the FSM Supreme Court held in Ishizawa v. Pohnpei,216
that the vessel owner was entitled to a prompt post-seizure hear-
ing, the Court had to establish the standards to be applied at the
hearing. Relying on United States law, the Court defined probable
cause as "a reasonable ground for suspicion, sufficiently strong to
warrant a cautious person to believe that a crime has been commit-
ted and that the item to be seized has been used in the crime."217
The Court further held that the Constitution requires that the de-
termination of "whether probable cause exists [must] be deter-
mined by the deliberate, impartial, judgment of a judicial officer"
making an independent assessment of probable cause. 218 The
question the Court must answer is whether, considering all of the
evidence from the viewpoint of the arresting officers, "a prudent
and cautious law enforcement officer, guided by reasonable train-
ing and experience" 219 would believe that the vessel was being
used to violate the fisheries laws. 220 Applying these standards, the
Ishizawa Court found that probable cause did not exist at the time
of the arrest because the evidence available to the government at
the time of the arrest established that the vessel was not fishing
within FSM waters. 221
In FSM v. Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621,222 the issue before the
FSM Supreme Court was whether the time for determining if prob-
able cause existed was at the time of arrest or at the time of the
216. 2 FSM Intrm. 67 (Pon. 1985).
217. Id. at 76 (citations omitted); see also FSM v. Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, 6
FSM Intrm. 584, 589 (Pon. 1994).
218. Ishizawa, 2 FSM Intrm. at 77 (citations omitted).
219. The Chuuk State Court has held in a non-fisheries setting that an officer's
lack of training can rise to the level of a due process violation. See Meitou v.
Uwera, 5 FSM Intrm. 139 (Chk. St. Ct. Tr. 1991). There is no reason to doubt that
the FSM Supreme Court would hesitate to apply this principal to arrests of fishing
vessels. Thus, the surveillance training conducted by the FFA is essential to the
FSM's enforcement of its fisheries law.
220. Ishizawa, 2 FSM Intrm. at 77.
221. Id. at 79-80.
222. 6 FSM Intrm. 584 (Pon. 1994), http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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probable cause hearing. In Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, the FSM Na-
tional Police boarded the vessel on the high seas for a routine in-
spection.223 According to the arresting officer's affidavit, the name
of the vessel on the fishing permit was different than the name of
the vessel the officer had boarded.224 The arresting officer's affida-
vit also stated that the captain did not produce a catch report or log
book, the VHF radio was not working, and the fish on board were
recently caught.225 Based on this knowledge, the arresting officer
concluded that the vessel was illegally fishing and arrested the
vessel on September 29th. 22 6 At the probable cause hearing held
on October 20th, defense counsel admitted that the vessel had been
fishing within the FSM EEZ, but asserted that probable cause did
not exist because the vessel had a valid permit at the time of ar-
rest.2 27 The Court found that the arresting officer had probable
cause to arrest the vessel based on the knowledge available and
known to the officer at the time of the seizure.228 Although the
owners of the vessel submitted evidence to the Court at the proba-
ble cause hearing establishing that the vessel had a valid permit to
fish within the FSM's EEZ, the Court refused to take this evidence
into account stating that the evidence submitted by the defense
was new evidence not available to the officers at the time of arrest
and therefore, irrelevant to the determination of probable cause.229
In other words, although defendants might ultimately prevail at
trial, the determination of the ultimate success on the merits was
an issue to be raised at trial, and not at the probable cause hear-
ing.230 Thus, at the time of seizing the vessel, the arresting officer,
based on training and experience, must have evidence and infor-
mation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the ves-
sel has been engaged in illegal fishing.
223. Id. at 587.
224. Id. at 587-88.
225. Id. at 588.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 590.
229. Id. at 590-91 n.9.
230. Id. at 590 n.8 ("The purpose of a post-seizure hearing ... is not to [sic] an
ultimate determination of the facts. That is the purpose of a trial. The issue at a
post-seizure hearing is limited to the question of whether the Government has suf-
ficient evidence to meet the threshold requirement of probable cause to detain.").
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2. Burden of Proof
The FSM Supreme Court has held that the government seiz-
ing the vessel has the burden of establishing probable cause for
that seizure.231 In FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708,232 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the government could meet its burden
of proof by introducing an affidavit instead of the testimony of the
arresting officer. In Yue Yuan Yu No. 708, the only evidence intro-
duced by the FSM at the probable cause hearing was the affidavit
of a marine surveillance officer who was not present for the search
or arrest of the vessel. 233 The FSM argued that it was not required
to produce a witness at the probable cause hearing and argued
that defendant could have subpoenaed the marine surveillance of-
ficers if the defendant wanted to question the officers regarding
the arrest of the vessel. 234 The Court held that the FSM bears the
burden of proving probable cause to arrest the vessel and that the
FSM could not avoid this burden by submitting as its only evidence
an unreliable affidavit and claiming that the defendants should
have subpoenaed the marine surveillance officers.235 At the proba-
ble cause hearing, the government has the burden of proving that
it had probable cause to seize the vessel and cannot shift its bur-
den of proof to the vessel owner.23 6
3. Evidentiary Standards
In order to meet its burden of proof, the government must in-
troduce reliable evidence at the probable cause hearing. 237 Accord-
ing to the FSM Supreme Court, the "probable cause hearing is an
informal, non-adversarial proceeding in which the formal rules of
evidence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
do not apply."2 38 Because formal rules of evidence do not apply in
probable cause hearings, probable cause may be established by
231. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 80 (Pon. 1985), http://www.fsmlaw.
org/fsm/decisions/; FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708, 7 FSM Intrm. 300 (Kos. 1995),
http:/www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
232. 7 FSM Intrm. 300 (Kos. 1995).
233. Id. at 302.
234. Id. at 303.
235. Id. at 305.
236. Id. at 306.
237. Id. at 300.
238. FSM v. Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, 6 FSM Intrm. 584, 589 (Pon. 1994), httpl/
www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/decisions/.
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hearsay evidence. 239 This does not mean that the Court is free to
ignore the rules of evidence completely.240 The Court should "re-
ceive all relevant evidence and discount evidence which is inher-
ently untrustworthy or suspicious."24 1 Further, the Court should
not rely on hearsay evidence when more competent evidence is
available. 242
In FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708,243 the FSM Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the affidavit of a marine surveil-
lance officer was trustworthy when more competent evidence was
readily available. At the probable cause hearing, the FSM intro-
duced as its only evidence to establish probable cause the affidavit
of a marine surveillance officer who was not involved in the search
or arrest of the vessel. 244 The defendant argued that because the
affidavit was inherently unreliable, it did not establish probable
cause to arrest the vessel. 245 The FSM Supreme Court found the
affidavit deficient, and therefore unreliable, because it did not
state how the officer gained the information contained in the affi-
davit, it did not identify the marine surveillance officers directly
involved in the search and arrest of the vessel, and it contained
unknown layers of hearsay.246 The Court stated that unreliable
hearsay evidence should not be used to establish probable cause
when more reliable and competent evidence was available in the
form of testimony from the arresting officer and documents seized
from the vessel. 247 Noting that the arresting officer could have
faxed his affidavit and a copy of the documents seized from the
vessel to the Court, the Court chastised the FSM for failing to use
the technology available within the country to ensure the use of
the most competent evidence at the probable cause hearing.248
The Court found that the FSM failed to establish probable
cause.249 Even though probable cause can be established through
hearsay evidence, the government cannot rely solely on hearsay
239. Yue Yuan Yu No. 708, 7 FSM Intrm. at 303.
240. Id. at 304.
241. Id. (citing 12 FED. P. § 33:36, at 66 (L.Ed. 1988)).
242. Id. (noting U.S. law).
243. Id. at 300.
244. Id. at 302-03.
245. Id. at 303.
246. Id. at 304.
247. Id. at 305.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 306.
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evidence but must use the most reliable and competent evidence
available at the probable cause hearing.250
The FSM Supreme Court has been aggressive in trying to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of defendants in in rem forfeiture ac-
tions, first by judicially creating a right to a probable cause
hearing and second by establishing substantive standards the gov-
ernment must meet to establish probable cause. Nevertheless, due
process is not met in most cases. Neither the type of post-seizure
hearing nor the minimum substantive due process requirements
established by the FSM Supreme Court are sufficient to create a
fundamentally fair hearing because neither take into account the
economic reality of the fishing industry.
VI. THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEM
The due process problem arises because of the inherent con-
flict between the economic reality of the fishing industry, the post-
seizure procedures created by the FSM Supreme Court, and the
FSM's obligation to report all vessels caught illegally fishing to the
FFA Regional Register. The economic reality is that in order to
generate income, the vessel and crew must fish. Every day the ves-
sel sits idly in port is a cost to the owner, which can be calculated
both in terms of lost revenue and cost of crew maintenance. 251
Thus, the owner's incentive is to return the asset to its revenue
generating function as soon as possible. In order for the vessel to
generate income, the vessel must fish; and in order for the vessel to
fish, the vessel must be released.
The FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction in the in rem forfei-
ture action only if the vessel (or a bond in lieu of the vessel) is
physically within the Court's jurisdiction. 252 If the vessel leaves
the FSM, the Court loses jurisdiction, and the Government cannot
maintain an in rem forfeiture action.253 Thus, the Government
has no incentive to release the vessel prior to a probable cause
hearing or prior to the execution of a settlement agreement.
The vessel owner's only options for release of the vessel are
settlement or a probable cause hearing. Usually the vessel owner
requests a probable cause hearing. The vessel owner is handi-
250. See id. 305-06.
251. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67, 75 (Pon. 1985).
252. See supra note 172.
253. Id.
2002]
84 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:43
capped by the lack of discovery and by the lack of foreign language
translators who can translate between English and the vessel
owner's and crew's native languages. These handicaps lead to the
vessel owner rarely introducing evidence to negate probable
cause.25 4 In the majority of cases, the Court finds probable cause
based upon hearsay evidence. 255
The economic need to return the vessel to the fishing grounds
accounts for the fact that the majority of the illegal fishing cases
filed are settled after the probable cause hearing and before trial.
The settlement is usually a global settlement that disposes of all
litigation filed based on the same underlying act, the civil penalties
action, the criminal action, and the in rem forfeiture action. 256
The only evidentiary hearing held, and thus the only objective
review of the seizure, is the probable cause hearing. The probable
cause hearing is in essence a determination on the merits. This
determination is based on hearsay evidence and without the vessel
owner having the real ability to present evidence in defense.
It can be argued that because the vessel owner is entitled to a
trial, due process concerns are not triggered. The decision to settle
is a voluntary strategic decision made by the vessel owner based on
economic incentives with no coercive act by the government. The
cost of settlement is the cost of doing business. This argument,
however, ignores reality.
The realities are that the FSM cannot prosecute the in rem
forfeiture action unless the vessel remains in the FSM or a bond is
paid to the Court, that the vessel owner cannot fish without its
vessel, that the only way to obtain a release of the vessel is through
the probable cause hearing or settlement, that the cost of settle-
ment is likely less than the cost of litigation, and that the FSM is
reporting violations of its fisheries laws to the FFA Regional Regis-
254. Moreover, the FSM Supreme Court has informed vessel owners that it is
futile to introduce exculpatory evidence at the probable cause hearing. See FSM v.
Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, 6 FSM Intrm. 584 (Pon. 1994) (noting refusal by Court to
consider exculpatory evidence presented by defense).
255. See, e.g., FSM v. Zhong Yuan Yu No. 621, 6 FSM Intrm. 584 (Pon. 1994)
(finding probable cause based on arresting officer's affidavit). In those cases where
the author represented the State of Yap in a probable cause hearing, probable
cause was based on hearsay evidence. Documentation is available in the Yap State
Office of the Attorney General.
256. Copies of settlement agreements the State of Yap has entered into are on
file with the author.
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ter based upon a finding of probable cause, not a finding of guilt.
In other words, because the vessel owner has made a business deci-
sion, which may be based solely on financial reasons and not a
guilty act, the vessel owner is penalized beyond the economic cost
of the terms of the settlement agreement. The additional economic
costs results from the FSM's report of the vessel to the FFA Re-
gional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels, which report can nega-
tively affect the vessel's ability to obtain future fishing permits in
the FSM and in other FFA countries.257 The potential imposition
of these additional penalties based upon a finding of probable
cause, which was based on hearsay, and not on a finding of guilt,
creates fundamental unfairness and raises due process concerns.
These due process concerns are compounded because the probable
cause hearing, a non-adversarial proceeding with relaxed rules of
evidence and procedure and a lesser burden of proof, is in effect a
hearing on the merits.
VII. CREATING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
Even though FSM law does not favor forfeitures, 258 forfeiture
in the form of a cash settlement in lieu of forfeiture is the status
quo under the procedure established by the FSM Supreme Court.
While at first blush the income derived from the settlement of
these illegal fishing cases appears beneficial to the FSM and state
governments, a fundamentally unfair procedure that imposes un-
due costs on an industry that is vital to the economic well-being of
the country does not benefit either the FSM or the individual
states. In developing a solution, the reality of the fishing industry
and the constraints on the FSM must be considered and a balance
struck between protecting the vessel owner and accounting for the
logistical and economic limitations of the FSM. Moreover, any so-
lution requires the cooperation of all branches of government.
A. Authority to Create a Solution
The FSM Congress, the legislatures of each of the four states,
and the FSM Supreme Court all have the authority to fashion a
fundamentally fair procedure for prosecuting in rem forfeiture ac-
257. If a foreign fishing vessel is not in good standing on the FFA Regional
Register, no FFA member state will issue that vessel a fishing license. See Nauru
Agreement, supra note 70, arts. IV(b), V; Niue Treaty, supra note 76, art. IV(2).
258. FSM v. Skico, Ltd. (I), 7 FSM 550, 552 (Chk. 1996).
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tions. Any solution enacted by the FSM Congress would, however,
only apply to in rem forfeiture actions brought by the FSM Secre-
tary of Justice alleging violation of the 2002 Act, not to actions
brought by any of the states for violation of that st.ate's fisheries
laws.259 Likewise, any solution enacted by the legislature of any of
the four states of the FSM would only apply to in rem forfeiture
actions brought by that state, not to actions brought by any other
state or by the FSM. Because the FSM Supreme Court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over maritime cases, 260 including illegal fishing
cases, the Court is the only entity that can fashion a fundamen-
tally fair procedure applicable to all in rem forfeiture actions
brought against vessels charged with illegally fishing within the
FSM. Moreover, because the FSM Supreme Court is the only
branch of government to date that has addressed the issue of the
vessel owner's due process rights and because the Court can exer-
cise independent rulemaking authority, the Court is the most
likely branch of government to act. Since the right to a post-
seizure hearing and the substantive standards applied during the
hearing have all been judicially created and since the Court is the
entity which will be implementing any solution, the Court is the
most logical branch of government to establish a new procedure for
post-seizure hearings in in rem forfeiture actions.
B. Prompt Trial on the Merits
In order to create a fundamentally fair post-seizure hearing in
in rem forfeiture actions, the post-seizure hearing should be a trial
on the merits, not a probable cause hearing. In Ishizawa v.
Pohnpei,261 the FSM Supreme Court held that the vessel owner
was entitled to a post-seizure hearing. That post-seizure hearing
is not required to be a probable cause hearing. In fact, the United
States cases upon which the FSM Supreme Court based its deci-
sion held that the property owner was entitled to a prompt post-
seizure hearing and that such a hearing could be the trial on the
259. It is possible that NORMA and the FSM Secretary of Justice can address
some of these due process concerns in the administrative penalty procedures au-
thorized under the 2002 Act. Pub. L. No. 12.034, § 703. As of October 2002, these
administrative procedures had not been promulgated.
260. See supra note 163.
261. Ishizawa v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67 (Pon. 1985).
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merits.26 2 Thus, requiring the post-seizure hearing in these forfei-
ture actions to be a trial on the merits complies with constitutional
due process requirements.
Requiring a prompt trial on the merits is not detrimental to
the prosecuting government. Currently, there is often a substan-
tial time delay between the probable cause hearing and the settle-
ment. After probable cause has been found, the owner of the vessel
usually posts a bond; the vessel and crew are released and return
to the fishing grounds. Occasionally, a pre-trial motion will be
filed, but little or no- discovery is conducted and government wit-
nesses disperse. In most cases, the Government can present its
best case at the probable cause hearing, not at a later trial date.
A prompt trial on the merits takes into account the economic
reality of the fishing industry. Within a set period of time after
arrest, the vessel owner would have a determination of guilt or in-
nocence based on the merits, and the vessel would be released to
return to the fishing grounds. Both the vessel owner and the pros-
ecuting government would know the exact extent of the vessel
owner's liability. Furthermore, any report made to the FFA Re-
gional Register would be based on a determination of guilt on the
merits, not on a finding of probable cause based on hearsay. There
would no longer be the concern that the vessel owner may be sub-
ject to the additional future penalty of being denied a fishing li-
cense based on less than a finding that the vessel had violated the
FSM's or state's fisheries laws.
If the solution of a prompt trial on the merits is adopted, the
question becomes how soon after the arrest should the trial be
scheduled? This question is complicated by the fact that most ar-
rests occur on the high seas. It can take several days for a vessel to
arrive at a port depending both upon the distance the vessel must
travel and the weather conditions. Thus, any rule formulated by
the FSM Supreme Court should be definite enough that the post-
seizure hearing is prompt, but also flexible enough to take into ac-
count the inherent difficulties of travel within the FSM.
In formulating a rule, the FSM Supreme Court must also take
into account the reality that a Justice of the Court is not always
present on each of the islands; nor are the parties or their respec-
262. FSM v. Skico, Ltd (II), 7 FSM Intrm. 555, 557 (stating that only post-
seizure hearing needed is trial on merits) (discussing United States v. $8,850, 461
U.S. 555 (1983)).
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tive attorneys always present in the state where the vessel is ar-
rested. Thus, in order to ensure that a prompt trial on the merits
is held and that both parties can present evidence and confront
witnesses the Court must make use of and allow the parties to
make use of the technology available within the FSM.
C. Proposed Rule for In Rem Forfeiture Actions
The following rule should be adopted by the FSM Supreme
Court:
Forfeiture Actions - Illegal Fishing
1. This Rule shall apply to all forfeiture actions brought
against vessels charged with violating the FSM Marine
Resources Act of 2002 or any fisheries law of one of the
states of the FSM.
2. In a forfeiture action brought against a vessel charged
with illegal fishing in violation of the fisheries laws of the
FSM or one of its states, trial shall commence no later
than twenty-one days after the date the vessel is ar-
rested. For good cause shown, the Court may grant a
party's motion for a continuance.
3. For the purposes of this Rule, a vessel is arrested when
an authorized surveillance officer of either the FSM or
one of the states of the FSM takes command of the vessel
for the purpose of enforcing the fisheries laws of the FSM
or one of its states. Whether a person is an authorized
surveillance officer shall be determined by statute or
treaty.
4. When requesting a continuance, the party requesting the
continuance shall state in writing the reason for the con-
tinuance. (a) If the prosecuting government requests a
continuance, good cause shall include those situations
where the vessel's arrival in port has been delayed due to
weather or due to an act of the vessel's crew or where the
prosecuting government is waiting for scientific testing of
evidence or translation of foreign language documents.
(b) If a defendant requests a continuance, the request
shall be deemed a waiver of that defendant's right to a
prompt post-seizure hearing. Moreover, if a defendant
requests a continuance, good cause shall include those
situations where the defendant is waiting for scientific
testing of evidence or translation of foreign language doc-
uments. (c) The party requesting the continuance due to
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scientific testing of evidence or translation of foreign lan-
guage documents must submit evidence to the Court that
the evidence or documents were sent for testing or trans-
lation at the first possible opportunity. (d) A request for a
continuance made solely for the purpose of delay or to
thwart justice shall not be granted.
5. On a case-by-case basis, the Court shall determine the
most appropriate method of proceeding with the trial.
Whenever possible, the Court shall use all available tech-
nology to meet the needs of the parties and to ensure a
prompt and fair trial on the merits.
The proposed rule addresses a number of issues. First, based
upon the FSM Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction, the pro-
posed rule clearly states that it applies to all in rem forfeiture ac-
tions brought against vessels charged with illegal fishing,
regardless of whether the prosecuting government is the FSM or
one of the states. Second, the proposed rule balances the need to
have a definite date on which the trial must commence with the
possibility that, in a particular case, either the prosecuting govern-
ment or the vessel owner may need additional time to prepare for
trial. The twenty-one day period within which the trial must com-
mence is flexible, allowing the Court to set the trial date based
upon the actual circumstances of each arrest. If the vessel was ar-
rested at the edge of the FSM EEZ and the vessel did not arrive in
port for more than a week, then the Court might set the trial for
the twenty-first day. If, however, the vessel was arrested a few
miles off the reef, then the trial could be set for an earlier date.
The proposed rule also takes into account the geography of the
FSM and the reality that a Justice of the FSM Supreme Court and
the parties' attorneys are not always on the same island as the
arrested vessel. The proposed rule allows the Court to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether all parties to the action must ap-
pear in the same courtroom or to allow the trial to proceed through
use of technology. The authorization of the use of technology is not
new. For example, Associate Justice Martin Yinug uses telephone
conferences on a regular basis. 263 The proposed rule is drafted
broadly enough to allow the Court to adopt new forms of technol-
ogy as they become available.
263. See, e.g., FSM v. Yue Yuan Yu No. 78, 7 FSM Intrm. 300 (Kos. 1995).
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D. Additional Changes
In addition to the FSM Supreme Court adopting a prompt trial
rule, the issues of courtroom technology, foreign language transla-
tors, and marine surveillance officer training must also be ad-
dressed in order to ensure a fundamentally fair trial. While a
telephone conference may be sufficient for a probable cause hear-
ing where no witness testimony is being offered into evidence, a
telephone conference would be insufficient for trial. In order to ac-
commodate for the geography of the country and to ensure that
both parties have the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses and that the court can observe the demeanor of
the witnesses, video conferencing equipment should be installed in
each of the four courtrooms of the FSM Supreme Court. Addition-
ally, access to foreign language translators must be made available
either by training Micronesians in those foreign languages most
commonly spoken by foreign fishing permit holders or by seeking
outside translators through the FFA. If the FSM Supreme Court
had video conferencing technology, it would not be necessary to
maintain translators at each courthouse. Rather a pool of qualified
translators could be available throughout the FSM, or even the Pa-
cific region, and could translate via the available video conferenc-
ing technology. Finally, training of surveillance officers is
essential to ensuring that vessel owners' due process rights are not
violated and in ensuring that the prosecuting government can
meet its burden of proof at trial. It remains essential that the FSM
continue to utilize the training programs available through the
FFA and other international sources for training not only FSM
surveillance officers but also state surveillance officers. In order to
adequately address these concerns, the FSM Congress must act by
appropriating the necessary funds and NORMA must act by seek-
ing technical assistance from the FFA.
Exercising its rulemaking authority, the FSM Supreme Court
should adopt the proposed rule, thereby establishing the constitu-
tionally required post-seizure hearing to be the trial on the merits.
A prompt trial on the merits remedies the due process concerns
that exist under the current system of probable cause hearings.
Moreover, in order to continue to ensure that the post-seizure
hearing remains fundamentally fair, the FSM Congress must con-
tinue to appropriate sufficient funds for the FSM Supreme Court
to have access to necessary technology, including video conferenc-
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ing and foreign language translators. In addition, NORMA must
continue to seek training of both FSM and state marine surveil-
lance officers from the FFA and other regional and international
programs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
After decades of colonial domination by distant water fishing
nations, the FSM has sought to capitalize on its primary economic
resource - the ocean. The FSM has worked with its counterparts
in other Pacific island nations to establish a regional framework
that focuses on realizing the economic benefits of the marine re-
sources that have traditionally sustained Pacific island cultures.
More importantly, the FSM and its four states have enacted fisher-
ies laws that seek to capitalize on the economic benefits of marine
resources while protecting traditional subsistence fisheries.
The FSM cannot reap economic benefits from a non-existent
fishing industry. It is essential that the FSM's domestic fisheries
laws, both enacted law and judicially created rules, consider the
economic reality of the fishing industry and balance the vessel
owner's constitutional due process rights with the economic and
geographic realities of the FSM.
The FSM Supreme Court has been aggressive in attempting to
ensure that the vessel owner is afforded due process by judicially
creating the right to a prompt post-seizure hearing and enforcing
substantive due process protections. While on the surface these
acts by the FSM Supreme Court appear to safeguard the vessel
owner's due process rights, when examined more closely with an
understanding of the fishing industry and with an understanding
of how the government prosecutes in rem forfeiture actions against
fishing vessels, it is apparent that these judicially created safe-
guards are not sufficient to comply with constitutional due process.
The establishment of a fundamentally fair post-seizure hear-
ing is not difficult, time consuming, or costly. The FSM Supreme
Court should once again take the initiative and adopt a rule of a
prompt trial on the merits. The proposed rule for in rem forfeiture
actions strikes a balance between the economic reality of the fish-
ing industry, the economic and geographic reality of the FSM, and
the needs and concerns of the prosecuting government. In effect,
the proposed rule recognizes what, in most instances, is actually
happening - the probable cause hearing is the only evidentiary
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hearing and thus, a hearing on the merits. Recognizing that the
post-seizure hearing is a trial on the merits, the vessel owner is
afforded all of the due process rights afforded a party at trial. The
hearing process is transparent and fundamentally fair. Constitu-
tional due process has been met.
